Post Conviction Problems and the Defective Delinquent by Gafni, Miriam L. & Welsh, Barney B.
Volume 12 Issue 3 Article 7 
1967 
Post Conviction Problems and the Defective Delinquent 
Miriam L. Gafni 
Barney B. Welsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Miriam L. Gafni & Barney B. Welsh, Post Conviction Problems and the Defective Delinquent, 12 Vill. L. Rev. 
545 (1967). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
SPRING 1967]
COMMENTS
POST CONVICTION PROBLEMS AND
THE DEFECTIVE DELINQUENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislators have been attempting to solve the complex problem of
the mentally defective criminal for the past fifty years.' Programs de-
signed to rehabilitate the normal offender proved to be of little value
when applied to the mental defective.2 Unable to keep up with the normal
inmates, the retarded offender stagnated. Furthermore, the presence of
this type of individual was thought to have a detrimental effect on the
regular penal program.3 Legislation drawn in broad language, and known
as "Defective Delinquent" statutes, was passed at the urging of penologists
to provide special treatment for the mentally retarded offender. These
statutes are designed to protect society from the recidivistic mentally de-
fective offender and to place him in an institution where he can receive
specialized treatment. 4 The defective delinquent is viewed as an institu-
tional problem as much as a societal problem. He cannot benefit from the
normal penal program nor can he be treated in a certain specified time.5
Psychologists feel that by pacing the education and training program of
the retarded individual the frustration he experiences from normal com-
petitive experiences will be relieved, and he will be able to develop the
ability to cope with life's normal problems. 6 At the same time, it is
felt that releasing the defective delinquent into the community without
this special treatment will present a certain danger to the community as
well as to the individual. The statutes usually attempt to avoid this evil
by providing for an indeterminate sentence in order to insure a reasonable
1. The first such legislation was enacted in Massachusetts in 1911, MASS. Acts
& REsOLvEs 1911, ch. 59 , §§ 1-12. The statute has been amended many times and
now appears as MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 113-24 (1965).
2. Interview with Frank C. Johnston, Superintendent of the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas, the Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Institution, Nov. 25, 1966.
3. Gov't Consulting Service - Inst. of Local and State Gov't - Univ. of Pa.,
Coordination of the Program of Institutional Care of Juvenile Delinquents in Pennsyl-
vania 3 (1955).
4. Gordon & Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the Defective Delinquent
Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. RZv. 459, 477 (1950).
5. Interview with the Staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
6. Ibid.
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time to complete necessary treatment.7 The study which follows presents
an examination of the Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act.8
II. PENAL OR CIVIL
The Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act provides for the deten-
tion of males over the age of fifteen who have been convicted of a crime
or held as juvenile delinquents, and who, in the opinion of the examining
authorities,9 are mentally defective and have criminal tendencies, "whether
or not coupled with mental instability," at the State Correctional Institu-
tion at Dallas' 0 as part of, or for the remainder of their sentence, or until
further order of the court." In determining the constitutionality of this
commitment procedure, the primary inquiry must be directed at a judicial
determination as to whether the act is civil or criminal in nature.' 2 A
finding that the statute is penal rather than civil will subject it to stringent
examination in the areas of definition, procedural due process, and cruel
and unusual punishment.
The commitment of persons who are insane, feebleminded, or unable
to care for themselves has traditionally been considered a civil rather
than a criminal proceeding,'3 the rationale being that the committed in-
dividual is the beneficiary of commitment and treatment. The state stands
in the position of parens patriae, and the inherent safeguards of due
process in criminal proceedings are considered unnecessary.' 4 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court invoked this theory in Ex parte Dubois
in holding that that state's defective delinquent statute was civil in nature:
The general power of the Legislature, in its capacity as parens
patriae, to make suitable provision for incompetent persons who are
unable to take care of themselves, cannot be controverted. . . . In
no sense is it [Defective Delinquent Statute] a criminal or penal
statute. It does not purport to define a crime and it imposes no
penalty. Commitment under its provisions is not in the nature of
punishment.' 5
7. The indeterminate sentence has been characterized as the only effective way
to deal with any kind of offender and particularly with the offender who has mental
problems. Menninger, Verdict Guilty - Now What?, Harpers, Aug., 1959, p. 60;
Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, __ Md -.. ------ ,221 A.2d 397, 411 (1966).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 541-1 to 542.6 (1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,§ 1161 (1964). The Act was first passed in 1937, amended in 1945, and the present
institution at Dallas was created by statute in 1953. Dallas opened in 1960.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964). The statute provides for an inquiry
by a psychiatrist and a psychologist or by two qualified physicians, but does not set
any further qualifications.
10. The Institution was formerly known as the Pennsylvania Institution for Defec-
tive Delinquents; this was changed to the State Correctional Institution at Dallas by
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.2 (1964).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
12. Initially, the legislative classification must be a rational one. This problem
will be dealt with in Section III infra.
13. Mihm, A Re-Examination of the Validity of Our Sexual Psychopath Statutes
in the Light of Recent Appeal Cases and Experience, 44 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 716,
718 (1954).
14. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270 (1940);
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
15. 331 Mass. 575, 578-79, 120 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1954).
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The Massachusetts act closely resembles the Pennsylvania statute. In
Massachusetts, a person over the age of fifteen who is charged with a
crime which is dangerous to life or limb (other than murder) may be
examined by two experts. If he is found to be mentally defective, and
a hearing reveals that he has exhibited dangerous tendencies, he may be
committed to a department for defective delinquents.'0 Both the Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts statutes exclude the insane and the feeble-
minded from the definition of a mental defective.' 7 The Dubois court
drew its support from rulings which validated the above type commit-
ment,'8 without considering the statutory requirement that an individual
be charged with a crime as a prerequisite to his commitment. In extend-
ing the parens patriae doctrine to the defective delinquent, the court
apparently adopted the view that the mental defective cannot be distin-
guished from the feebleminded or insane in so far as the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence is concerned.'1
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held Maryland's defective
delinquent statute to be civil in nature in Director of Patuxent Institution
v. Daniels.20 Before considering the Daniels case, however, it is important
to note the difference between the Maryland and the Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts statutes. The Maryland statute is broader than the Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts statutes in that it includes the sexual psycho-
path within its coverage.2 ' A defective delinquent is an individual who
demonstrates aggravated criminal behavior and who is found to have
either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to
clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society.22 The Maryland act
therefore provides for the mentally disordered as well as the mentally
deficient. In construing the statute, the Daniels court considered only the
emotional unbalance aspect of the definition:
We further point out that the purpose of this act is so closely akin
to the so-called "Sexual Psychopath" laws enforced in some twenty
(20) states and the District of Columbia, that the decisions of the
Courts in those jurisdictions that each of their laws is civil in nature
is ample authority to conclude that the Maryland Act is regulatory.
(Citations omitted.) 23
The court cited a line of cases which have continually treated sex offender
statutes as civil proceedings analogous to sentencing hearings and hearings
16. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113(1957.
•k Sporza v. German Say. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908) ; In re Dowdell,
169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
19. Neither the Pennsylvania nor the Massachusetts statutes define "mentally
defective." This problem will be considered in Section III infra.
20. ____ Md -.....- 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
21. Pennsylvania's sexual offender statute is referred to as the Barr-Walker Act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (1964). The Massachusetts act appears as MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1-11 (1957).
22. MD. ANN. CODx art. 31B, § 5 (Supp. 1966).
23. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, __Md. __ 22 A.2d 397,
410 (1966).
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for the commitment of the insane.2 4 In following the guidelines laid down
by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,25 the court in
Daniels concluded that the statute when viewed on its face demonstrated
a purpose to protect society and treat the individual so as to effectuate a
cure, and not to promote the aims of punishment, deterrence or retribu-
tion.26 It should be noted that the steady stream of cases cited by the
Daniels court as characterizing proceedings under sex offender statutes
as civil in nature have not rendered that question moot. In recent years,
a growing concern has centered around an apparent lack of procedural
safeguards in these statutes.27 In 1938, the Michigan Supreme Court, in
People v. Frontczak28 , overturned a sexual offender statute as violative
of the due process clause of the Michigan Constitution. In discussing the
statute, which was part of Michigan's code of criminal procedure, the
court noted that: "When the law penalizes an overt act it cannot, under
criminal procedure and under the guise of hospitalization, in another court
and a different jurisdiction, try him on the footing of his conviction else-
where and add to or subtract or change his sentence. '29 The court dis-
tinguished the sex offender proceeding from an insanity hearing, since
jurisdiction in the latter case attaches only by reason of the accused's
insanity, whereas under the sex offender statute, jurisdiction accrues only
after conviction and the determination of sanity. 0
The court in Danielss ' also relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court 2 where a similar
statute was held not violative of the equal protection clause. Petitioner
Pearson had claimed in the alternative that the Minnesota statute was
24. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Gross v. Superior
Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 816, 820, 270 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1954) ; People v. Chapman, 301 Mich.
584, 596, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942) ; State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249,
232 S.W.2d 897 (1950).
25. [W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), as quoted in Director of
Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, ____ Md. , ___ 221 A.2d 397, 410 (1966).
26. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, supra note 25, at , 221 A.2d
at 411. The effect of the Daniels decision is to affirm an earlier Maryland decision
which held that detention under the Act is not punishment for a crime, but is preventive
and therapeutic. Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 121 A.2d 698 (1956).
27. See, e.g., Gross v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954) ; People
v. Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d 446, 213 N.E.2d 55 (1965). See also Note, 41 NOTR" DAME
LAW. 527 (1966); Recent Legislation, 100 U. PA. L. Rev. 727 (1952); Legislation,
13 U. PIT'T. L  Rzv. 739 (1952).
28. 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
29. Id. at 58, 281 N.W. at 536.
30. Id. at 59, 281 N.W. at 537. Shortly after the law was declared unconstitu-
tional, the Michigan legislature passed a new law which was not part of the criminal
code, but which was substantially the same as the prior act. This law was upheld as
a civil proceeding in People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
31. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, ..... Md. , 221 A.2d 397,
410 (1966).
32. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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lacking in the procedural safeguards required by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. While the Court did not discuss the pro-
cedural challenges, it cautioned that if the statute were used to abuse the
constitutional rights and privileges of the sex offender, the Court was
prepared to reconsider its constitutionality. 3
Six months prior to the Daniels decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit opened a new era in the field of sexual offender statutes
in United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,34 when it unanimously
held that the commitment proceedings provided for in the Barr-Walker
Act (Pennsylvania's sex offender statute) are criminal in nature, and that
the constitutional safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination must
therefore be afforded a defendant who is subject to the statute.8 5 The
court in Daniels, in citing the many sexual offender statute cases as
authority for its decision, failed to recognize the Gerchman case. This
judicial oversight detracts significantly from its value in determining
whether Pennsylvania's defective delinquent statute is civil or penal in
nature.
The commitment procedures in the Barr-Walker Act are so similar
to those of the Defective Delinquent Act that the judicial determination
in the Gerchman case should certainly be applied to that statute. The
court in Gerchman determined that the Barr-Walker Act involved an
independent criminal proceeding3 6 rather than a simple sentencing pro-
cedure which would be considered civil in nature.3 7 In analogizing to the
decisions in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,38 Oyler v. Boles,3 9 and
Chandler v. Fretag,40 the Third Circuit found that the conviction of one
of the enumerated crimes under the Barr-Walker Act, although a pre-
requisite to the invocation of the law, was only subordinate to the new
issue of the defendant's potential threat to society. 41 Similarly, convic-
tion of a crime or an adjudication of delinquency is a prerequisite to the
application of the defective delinquent statute,4 2 but it is also subordinate
to a new issue - whether the defendant is mentally defective and has
criminal tendencies. The Gerchman court ruled that the Barr-Walker Act
33. Id. at 277.
34. 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966), 12 VILL. L. Rxv. 183 (1966).
35. The Barr-Walker Act is the Pennsylvania sexual offender act. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (1964). Following the Supreme Court opinions in Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), whichheld that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination were basic to a fair trial
under the sixth amendment, and were obligatory upon the States through the four-
teenth amendment, the Court of Appeals established this requirement for the Barr-
Walker procedure.
36. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966).37. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
38. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Draft evasion conviction was held to be preliminary to,
but separate from the penal denationalization procedure.
39. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
40. 348 U.S. 3 (1954). The Court construed these habitual offender acts as
creating new offenses and requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a criminal
proceeding on the issue of identity.
41. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
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removed the discretionary feature of judicial sentencing,4 and that a
court must make a new finding of fact with regard to a defendant's
potential threat to society. Once the judge finds the person a threat and
invokes the act, he must impose a sentence of from one day to life.44
The case then passes to the Board of Parole. 45 This factor, coupled with
the placement of the Barr-Walker Act in the section on criminal pro-
cedure, 40 indicated to the court that a criminal proceeding was involved.
The Defective Delinquent Act also appears in the section on criminal
procedure, 47 but it varies from Barr-Walker in the amount of judicial
discretion exercisable under commitment procedures. The court may
commit a defendant to the institution for defective delinquents as part
of the term of his sentence, or until further order of the court.4 Pres-
ently, there are 78 inmates at Dallas who were committed under indefinite
sentences (maximum and a minimum) 49 and 501 comitted who were under
indeterminate sentences.50 An offender committed directly upon convic-
tion may be subject to an indeterminate sentence, whereas an inmate
transferred to Dallas from another institution will have at least some
chance of retaining his original sentence. 51 But while the commitment
procedure under the Defective Delinquent Act involves more judicial
discretion than is permitted under the Barr-Walker procedure, a great
deal of similarity to Barr-Walker is revealed when the release procedure
under the Defective Delinquent Act is considered. An individual is re-
leased from Dallas: "When, in the opinion of the board, it appears that
the mental condition of any inmate has so improved that his release will
be beneficial and not incompatible with the welfare of society ... ",2
Release, therefore, is strictly the responsibility of the board at Dallas.5 3
There is no provision for review by the Board of Parole, and even if an
inmate is under an indefinite sentence, the board can petition the court
to retain custody of him. 54 The practical effect is the same under both
Acts - the length of an inmate's sentence is removed from the discretion
of the court.
43. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (1964).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1173 (1964).
46. Title 19 is the Pennsylvania title on criminal procedure.
47. The enabling act for the Defective Delinquent Act appears at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1161 (1964).
48. PA. S'rAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
49. A sentence with a maximum and a minimum (5-10 years) is referred to as an
indefinite sentence. A sentence that provides for commitment from one day to life, or
until the authorities deem it safe to release an inmate is called an indeterminate sentence.
50. Interview with the staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966. The sentencing provision in
the Barr-Walker Act reads from one day to life, see accompanying text at note 44
supra. If the court does not impose the original sentence for the crime, but simply in-
vokes the Defective Delinquent Act, the result is the same - an indeterminate sentence.
51. Ibid.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-9 (1964).
53. The board at Dallas is composed of the Superintendent, a Deputy Super-
intendent and Chief Psychological officers.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
[VOL. 12
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Furthermore, before an inmate can be released from Dallas, the court
must approve a plan for the inmate's return to the community, 55 which
must include a place to live, a job, etc.. The fact that the plan places
a considerable obstacle in the path of the inmate committed under an
indefinite or indeterminate sentence is quite evident from the fact that
there are presently 23 inmates approved for release by the board at Dallas
who remain imprisoned while awaiting court approval of their "plans."
At times, the number of inmates awaiting release has been as high as
100 !5 The demoralizing effect of this wait on an inmate may negate
any progress he has made at the institution. This situation should cer-
tainly alert the courts to the abuses inherent in characterizing loosely
drawn legislation which subjects individuals to possible life sentences as
civil in nature. Writing for the court in Gerchman, Judge Freedman said:
"The effort of enlightened penology to alleviate the condition of a con-
victed defendant by providing some elements of advanced, modem meth-
ods of cure and rehabilitation and possible ultimate release on parole
cannot be turned about so as to deprive a defendant of the procedure
which the due process clause guarantees in a criminal proceeding. '57
In addition to the Gerchman guidelines, a different type of standard
is relevant in determining whether the act is civil or penal in nature. The
Daniels court indicated that a civil commitment for special treatment must
provide that special treatment if the statute is to be sustained.5 8 Dallas
had 579 inmates as of November 10, 1966, and only two psychologists on
its staff. 50 Only 32 of the total prison population receive group psycho-
therapy.60 What "free time" is left to the two psychologists is devoted
to individual therapy, general behavioral problems, administrative duties,
and receipt of new and release of old prisoners. This means that little,
if any, specialized treatment is devoted to rehabilitating prisoners who
supposedly need special treatment. The result is that a prison regime of
a normal penitentiary scaled down to meet the intellectual deficiencies of
those imprisoned is all that exists at Dallas. Such a program cannot
justify the extended and in some cases deleterious sentences that result
by virtue of this "civil commitment." It follows that if this prison pro-
vides no generalized special treatment, sentences to Dallas should not
differ from those meted out to Eastern State Penitentiary convicts.
A finding that the Defective Delinquent Act is penal in nature will
of course necessitate important procedural reforms,"' but the act is sub-
ject to an additional constitutional challenge based on the recent Supreme
Court decision in Robinson v. California.2 In Robinson, the Court held
55. Interview with the staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
56. Ibid.
57. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 310 (3d Cir. 1966).
58. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Commonwealth v. Page, 339
Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959).
59. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
60. Ibid.
61. See section IV on commitment and release procedures infra.
62. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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that a California law which made the "status" of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense punishable by ninety days imprisonment inflicted a "cruel
and unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The court distinguished "status" from a normal criminal act on
the basis of the fact that a "status" is a continuing condition which differs
from most criminal acts in that it is chronic rather than acute, that it con-
tinues after it is complete, and that it subjects the offender to arrest at
any time before he reforms. 6 3 Mental defectiveness is analogous to nar-
cotic addiction in that it is chronic in nature. It may even be more severe
than narcotic addiction since there may be no cure or reform.64
Once convicted of a crime or adjudged delinquent and held by a
court or imprisoned, a defendant who is a mental defective and has
criminal tendencies is subject to an indeterminate commitment at Dallas. 65
The fact that a defendant may be imprisoned is only prerequisite and
subordinate to a new issue which requires an independent finding as to
his "status,"6 6 his mental defectiveness and his criminal tendency. This
finding can result in life imprisonment. Justice Stewart, speaking for the
Robinson Court, stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might deter-
mine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of
these and other human affections be dealt with by compulsory treat-
ment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in
the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. . . . Even one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime"
of having a common cold.67
There can be no question as to the type of institution Pennsylvania
maintains for defective delinquents. The State Correctional Institution
at Dallas is, in the strictest sense of the word, a prison. 8 It is under the
Bureau of Correction and is maintained as a maximum security installa-
tion. The administrative staff is largely composed of correctional person-
nel,69 the inmates are housed in conventional prison cells and are under
round-the-clock surveillance by a trained custodial force, and there is a
strict regard for the maintenance of discipline.7 0
63. Id. at 662-63.
64. Tizard, Introduction in MENTAL DEIcENcY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 4
(Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
66. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 310 (3d Cir. 1966).
67. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
68. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that Dallas, as its predecessor,
Huntingdon, is a state penal institution. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 185 Pa. Super. 136,
138 A.2d 140 (1958).
69. There are no psychiatrists or clinical psychologists on the staff at Dallas.
Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966; Nov. 25, 1966.
70. Interview and inspection at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966; Nov. 25, 1966.
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Patuxent, the Maryland institution for defective delinquents, cannot
be characterized so easily. Patuxent has been described by the Maryland
Court of Appeals as "neither a prison, a hospital nor an insane asylum,
but [an institution which] exercises some of the functions of all three."7 1
The administration and professional staff at Patuxent are quite different
from the staff at Dallas. The director of the institution is a psychiatrist
who sets all policies 72 with the aid of professors of psychiatry from the
Johns Hopkins and Maryland University Medical Schools who serve in
an advisory capacity.73 The institution's staff consists of three psychia-
trists, three psychologists, and a consulting psychiatrist and psychologist
who aid the professional staff in the performance of their duties. Thus,
Patuxent has a heavy medical and psychiatric emphasis, as contrasted
with Dallas' correctional emphasis. 74 The staff at Dallas feel that what-
ever difference Dallas possesses from the ordinary penal institution in
terms of treatment, it is primarily a maximum security prison.75 Conceiv-
ably, a court may avoid the issue of cruel and unusual punishment when
ruling on an institution such as Patuxent, because it is not an ordinary
penal institution. But the Pennsylvania institution at Dallas is quite
vulnerable to a Robinson attack based on the Gerchman decision and the
nature of the institution.
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFINITION OF
DEFECTIVE DELINQUENCY
It is with the usual legal-medical pitfalls encountered in defining
medical conditions in mind, that we examine the problems presented by
the definition of defective delinquency contained in the Pennsylvania act.
The medical profession's fear of rigid definitions and inflexible statutes
is equally matched by the demand of committing courts and the legal
profession in general for the formulation of definite diagnostic standards.
The Pennsylvania statute defines a defective delinquent as an indi-
vidual who, in the opinion of two examining physicians or a psychiatrist
and a psychologist, is "mentally defective and has criminal tendencies,
whether or not coupled with mental instability .... -76 but no definition
of "mentally defective," "criminal tendencies," or "mental instability"
appears in the act. The statute specifically excludes idiots, imbeciles,
psychopaths, infirmary cases, and the insane from its coverage, even if
they are mentally deficient. 77 The working concept of the Pennsylvania act
71. Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513, 121 A.2d 698, 702 (1956).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, §§ 2-3 (Supp. 1966).
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 4 (Supp. 1966).74. Boslow, Rosenthal & Gliedman, The Maryland Defective Delinquency Law -Psychiatric Implication for the Treatment of Antisocial Disorders Under the Law,
10 BRIT. J. DELINQU4NCY 5, 11-12 (1959-1960).
75. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
77. Ibid. There are no cross-references to the Mental Health Act definitions.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072 (1954).
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was derived from a resolution adopted by the 56th Annual Congress of
the American Prison Association :78
The defective delinquent is an offender, who, because of mental sub-
normality at times coupled with mental instability, is not amenable
to the ordinary custody and training of the average correctional
institution and whose presence therein is detrimental to both the type
of individual herein described and to the proper development of the
methods of rehabilitation of other groups of delinquents. Further,
the defective delinquent because of his limited intelligence and sug-
gestibility requires prolonged and careful training, preferably in a
special institution to develop habits of industry and obedience.
When the legislature passed the Defective Delinquent Act, they altered
the tenor of the Association's resolution by not making a finding of mental
instability a condition precedent to commitment. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, interpreting a similar statute in Ex Parte Dubois,
found that the term "mentally defective" describes a person whose men-
tality is less than normal.7 9 Crucial to the court's decision was an equating
of mental subnormality with an intellectual deficiency which, for all prac-
tical purposes, rests on an I.Q. determination."0
The I.Q. classification made upon an individual's commitment to
Dallas as a mental defective is not intended as a first step toward a cure,
but rather to determine those individuals who, though intellectually re-
tarded, are amenable to the special education and training that will enable
them to cope with the problems encountered in community life. The
defective delinquent does not have a disease or illness, but a "condition
of subnormal mental development, present at birth or in early childhood"
that is not curable.8 ' When an individual is committed, it is not expected
that a certain amount of time and training will increase his I.Q. and permit
him to re-enter the community of normal intelligence.8 2 The following
classification has been derived from a diagnostic evaluation of defective
delinquency 8" made by Leonard Mack, the Deputy Superintendent of
78. Mack, The Defective Delinquent - An Interpretive Analysis of Criteria Basic
to Diagnostic Evaluation of Defective Delinquency 1 (unpublished study of Dallas,
rev. ed. 1949). (Emphasis added.) Mr. Mack was the senior psychologist at Hunting-
don and is now the Deputy Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at
Dallas, which is the present institution for defective delinquents.
79. 331 Mass. 575, 580, 120 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1954).
80. Supra note 78, at 5; If the Pennsylvania statute is interpreted like that of
Massachusetts, then a simple I.Q. test measurement witll depict an individual's relation
on the intelligence curve as far as normalcy is concerned.
81. Tizard, Introduction in MENTAL DEFICIENCY - TH4 CHANGING OUTLOOK 4
(Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
82. Doll, Essentials of an Inclusive Concept of Mental Deficiency, 46 AM. J.
MENTAL DEFIcIENcY 214 (1941) ; Reid & Hinsey, A Demonstration Project for
Defective Delinquents, 11 CRIME & DMLIN. 375 (1965). The author assumed that a
Wechsler intelligence score was an estimate of a boy's ability to utilize his cognative
capacities at the time the test is given. An increase or decrease in later test scores
was taken to reflect his general state of "well being" rather than a change in his
"basic" intellectual ability.
83. Supra note 78.
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Dallas, and is based on the Wechsler-Bellevue or Binet-Simon Intelligence
Quotient ratings :4
85
801
75
70
Lowest Limit of Normalcy
Border Line Defectives
65
60
55
50 High Grade Imbecile (compar-
able to mental age of 3-7 years)
40
4035t0
25
20
Low Grade Imbeciles
Idiocy (comparable to mental
age of a 2 year old child)
Defective Delinquent Range
Feebleminded
Profound Defectiveness
The defective delinquent range of 50-80 includes those who should be
able to profit from a rehabilitative program at Dallas and ultimately re-
enter society. Those who do not possess the ability to care for themselves,
need prolonged care, and are only able to perform the simplest manual
operations (40 and below) are excluded from the definition, since it is
felt that their needs are best met in a home or institution for the feeble-
minded.85 Persons falling within this latter group are usually treated on
84. For other I.Q. classifications, see Clarke, A.M., Criteria and Classification
of Mental Deficiency in MENTAL DEFICIENCY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 43, 51(Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958) ; Gordon & Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the
Defective Delinquent Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. Rv. 459, 494 (1950).
85. Supra note 78.
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a par with insane persons, and are likely to meet the prescribed tests which
will absolve them of responsibility for their criminal acts.
86
Gordon and Harris have reported that the Massachusetts Defective
Delinquent Department was often referred to as a "dumping ground";87
Dallas, in some respects at least, can also be termed a "dumping ground."
The Pennsylvania statute specifically excludes the imbecile and idiot from
its coverage, yet there are approximately 35 such cases presently at Dal-
las.8s The needs of these individuals would be best met at an institution
for the feebleminded. Certainly, they do not belong in a maximum secur-
ity prison. Furthermore, there are at least 10 inmates at Dallas with
severe mental problems that a psychologist on the staff described as
psychotic. The staff reports that it has been impossible to arrange for
the transfer of these inmates to more suitable institutions because of over-
crowded conditions and the refusal of other institutions to accept them.8 9
Deputy Superintendent Mack's I.Q. classification presents upper as
well as lower limits. The lowest limit of normalcy is designated as 80,
and a rating above this figure should preclude commitment.90 The I.Q.
range at Dallas of 39-87 presents a possible group who are not considered
mentally defective and should be placed in a regular penal institution
in which they would serve the normal sentence for their crime.91 Dr.
Nicholas J. Frignito, Medical Director of the Philadelphia County Court,
estimated that there were four distinct types at Dallas: (1) those possess-
ing mental abnormalities, including psychotics or schizophrenics; (2)
mental defectives falling within the Dallas I.Q. range who possess crim-
inal tendencies, and those that do not possess such tendencies; (3) the
feebleminded; and (4) dull normals who are considered discipline prob-
lems at other institutions. 2 When viewed from the standpoint of I.Q.
determination and the statutory requirements as to the exclusion of cer-
tain groups, 10-20 percent 93 of the population of Dallas consists of per-
sons who should not be at the institution at all, and who cannot receive
adequate treatment there. For this portion of its population, Dallas is
merely providing the age-old function of state institutions - custodial
care.
86. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION (1960).
87. Gordon & Harris, supra note 84, at 497.
88. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966. The exact number would have
to be determined by a study of each individual case at the Institution. The figures
given are an approximation made by the staff.
89. Ibid.
90. Supra note 78.
91. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
92. Interview with Dr. Nicholas J. Frignito, Medical Director of Philadelphia
County Court, Oct. 25, 1966. Dr. Frignito stated that he considered individuals with
I.Q.'s as high as 84, not because he felt that an 80-84 I.Q. range designated a mental
defective, but because other applicable state institutions refused to receive individuals
possessing an I.Q. below 85. For a similar classification of the types of individuals
detained at New York's institution for defective delinquents at the time of the study,
see Pappurt, The Classification of Defective Delinquents, 26 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
421 (1935).
93. The total population of Dallas at the time of the writing of this Comment
is 601.
(VOL. 12
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If we accept the Dubois decision,94 and a mental defective is merely
someone below general normal intelligence, the definition of a defective
delinquent would not be too vague or indefinite when applied to an indi-
vidual of subnormal intelligence who has committed a crime or has
exhibited dangerous tendencies. 95 A reasonable man, upon reading the
Pennsylvania statute, would have fair warning9 6 that if he were below
the normal level of intelligence and had committed a crime, he would be
subject to the statutory penalties. The act, if construed solely on an I.Q.
basis, would be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to
it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties .... 9T
Extensive research, however, has not revealed a single source that
supports the definition of a mental defective contained in Dubois. In
fact, it is almost universally agreed that subnormal intelligence alone,
plus the commission of a crime, should not be the sole basis for a de-
termination of defective delinquency. Deputy Superintendent Mack's diag-
nostic analysis of defective delinquency has been accorded great weight
in this study and is accepted by the authors as an institutional standard
for Dallas. Mr. Mack places great emphasis on mental instability in his
diagnostic definition of a defective delinquent, thus giving primary weight
to a factor which the legislature has seen fit to render useless by making
it optional. 98 He defines the type of individual who should be committed
to Dallas as an individual who is intellectually subnormal and of rather
marked self and social mal-adjustment. Classification of these individuals
necessitates the formulation of a complete case history, which includes
a consideration of such features as home life and school record, and
comprehensive diagnostic interviewing. The necessity for a comprehensive
set of standards and a definitive and exhaustive clinical evaluation is
especially acute when the "Borderline Mentally Defective Category" with-
in the I.Q. range of 70-809) is considered since this type of offender often
need not be committed under an indeterminate sentence, but can be ade-
quately provided for in the normal penal institution. Furthermore, given
the fact that a great proportion of our population would perform at a
defective level psychometrically, and that many of this group are able to
94. 331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E.2d 920 (1954).
95. If the statute is civil in nature, void for vagueness would not be a problem.
It is when a statute is penal that an individual may complain of his having to speculate
at the cost of his life or liberty on what is expected of him. Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
96. A statute must be sufficiently certain and definite in its form and interpretation
so as to give notice to the persons affected of what will be punished. Commonwealth
v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276 (1957). In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939), the Court stated that, "All are entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids."
97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 368 (1927). For a discussion of the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine, see Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rtv. 67 (1960).
98. Mack, The Defective Delinquent - An Interpretive Analysis of Criteria Basic
to Diagnostic Evaluation of Defective Delinquency (An unpublished study at Dallas,
rev. ed. 1949).
99. Id. at 6.
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live fruitful and happy lives, Mr. Mack is of the opinion that the defec-
tive delinquent must also possess the "irresponsible, incorrigible actions
of typical behavior problems."100 In addition to these requirements, Mr.
Mack would set an age limit of 15-30 years in order to preserve the youth-
ful nature of the institution and secure the effectuation of the type of
program anticipated. The staff at Dallas also feel that if an individual
has been able to avoid confrontation with the law up to age twenty-five
or thirty, he does not show the mental instability necessary for an adequate
diagnosis even if he is intellectually subnormal.101
To further complicate the definitional problems, Mr. Mack distin-
guishes between two types of incorrigible behavior patterns. Although
they are seldom mutually exclusive, one pattern can be said to stem from
acute emotional disturbances while the other arises chiefly out of unde-
sirable life situations or weighty social pressures. 10 2 Mr. Mack would place
those individuals whose delinquency is directly attributable to social pres-
sure or a trying life situation on probation or in foster homes; commit-
ment may not be warranted for such individuals, despite their mental de-
fectiveness and delinquency. The importance of a broad clinical appraisal
in this situation cannot be overemphasized for the diagnosis of an indi-
vidual's condition will determine whether he will be subject to the free-
dom of a foster home, short incarceration, or a possible life sentence.
Needless to say, the statutory standards are appalling considering the
subtleties of the problem and the serious consequences that occur on a
finding of mental defectiveness.
Mr. Mack concludes, as do Gordon and Harris 103 in their study of
the Massachusetts law, by setting a maximum cut-off for definitional pur-
poses based on an I.Q. determination. A score above 80 on the Binet-
Simon and Wechsler tests' 04 would preclude a diagnosis of defective de-
linquency, while a score under 80 would be the basis for further exam-
ination. It is interesting to note that five years prior to the Dubois deci-
sion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court specifically stated that a
psychometric rating was not the only element to be considered in deter-
mining a variance from normal mentality.105
Mr. Mack's report has been relied upon to depict the wide divergence
between the statutory definition and the institutional standard. A differ-
ence of opinion as to diagnostic criteria also exists between examining
court psychiatrists. In a recent Philadelphia County Court case, the court
psychiatrist, Dr. Martin H. Robinson, indicated that there was a difference
between functional and intellectual mental deficiency without clearly de-
fining that difference or explaining its significance in terms of the statu-
100. Id. at 4.
101. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
102. Mack, supra note 98, at 5.
103. Gordon & Harris, supra note 84, at 497.
104. For a discussion of intelligence tests, see FREEMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE
OP PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (3d ed. 1962).
105. Petition of Commissioner of Correction, 324 Mass. 535, 87 N.E.2d 207 (1949).
[VOL. 12
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/7
SPRING 1967]
tory definition. He indicated that a person could be classified as mentally
deficient if he did not have the average ability to abstract, sustain concen-
tration, retain materials, and learn and retain learning, in conjunction with
a limited ability for judgment. According to Dr. Robinson, an individual
with an I.Q. score of less than 90 would fall within his definition of a
mental defective.10 6 Doctors Stickler and Andrews, court psychologists,
stated that an I.Q. of 89 definitely negated a finding of mental de-
ficiency.' 0 7 At the same time, Dr. Wouters, another court psychiatrist,
does not consider I.Q. determinative, but attempts to determine whether
the person being examined can function in society. He would classify a
person as mentally defective under this standard even if his scores showed
an I.Q. of 120, although he would not consider such a person mentally
deficient.'0
Up to this point in our study, we have been considering a definition
of defective delinquency which necessarily includes a finding of mental
deficiency, mental instability, and the commission of a crime or an adjudi-
cation of delinquency. We conclude, on the basis of information obtained
as a result of field studies conducted with the cooperation of trained
personnel who have been working with defective delinquents for many
years, 10 9 that the conclusion that the mental instability segment of the
definition negated by the legislature is of primary importance in effecting
a valid diagnosis is inescapable. At the same time, we accept the view
that a mentally defective classification describes a person of a subnormal
intelligence which can be adequately measured by an I.Q. determination.
That is, the Dubois decision and the Pennsylvania statute are under-inclu-
sive definitions. Neither encompass the many attributes which are neces-
sary for a finding of defective delinquency, while both create the varia-
tion in standards that medical authorities attached to committing courts
are trying to use. The acceptance of an I.Q. determination as a basis of
mental deficiency even when coupled with a clinical evaluation leading to
a conclusion of mental instability may not be a wholly tenable position. 10
A complete analysis of the validity of the I.Q. and other testing
devices is beyond the scope of this paper, but a surface knowledge is neces-
106. Brief for Juveniles, p. 15, In the Matter of Ardry Jones and John Williams,
County Court of Philadelphia, Juvenile Division, October, 1966.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Ibid.
109. Interview with Superintendent and staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966, plus the
aforementioned report of Mack, supra note 98. Interview with Dr. Nicholas J. Frignito,
Medical Director of the Philadelphia County Court, Oct. 25, 1966.
110. Mental deficiency may include the characteristics inherent in a finding of
mental instability. For example, Edgar A. Doll, a leading authority in the field,
includes social incompetence as part of a definition of mentally deficient. Doll,
Essentials of an Inclusive Concept of Mental Deficiency, 46 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY
214 (1941). The result of this type of analysis is to make a finding of mental deficiency
equal to a finding of defective delinquency. The authors are of the opinion that in
view of the statute and the Dubois decision, "mentally defective" represents subnormal
intelligence, and the inclusion of "mental instability" in the statute, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964), though optional, supports this view. For all practical purposes,
this is an I.Q. determination. Supra note 98, at 5.
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sary to an understanding of commitment procedures and the quality of
the examinations conducted by court connected authorities. The dangers
in the use of I.Q. as the sole criterion of mental deficiency inhere in
a lack of a perfect relationship between I.Q. and social behavior,"' in-
correct testing by persons inadequately qualified in psychometrics," 2 lan-
guage and cultural barriers," 3 physical problems, mental disorders," 4 and
psychological "blocking."' 15 Another group of tests known as projective
studies have been used to discover patterns of overt behavior. These tests
are thought to be determinant of personality characteristics such as aggres-
siveness, neurotic and psychotic aberration, homosexuality, and egocen-
tricity.11 6 The Rorschach test," 7 and the HTP"' and DAPS (drawing
of a house, tree, person, and the make-a-person test) are tests of person-
ality structure which are considered to be invaluable aids in checking I.Q.
determinations and confirming clinical observations of mental deficiency." 9
In addition, the Thematic Apperception Test 120 may serve as a useful
tool in the hands of a skilled psychologist.
We found, as did Gordon and Harris in their study of the defective
delinquent in Massachusetts,' 21 that the psychiatrist and the psychologists
employed by the State consider the tests mentioned useless in examining
suspected defective delinquents, despite their general widespread accept-
ance. Examining psychiatrists and psychologists feel that these tests re-
quire an imagination which the mentally deficient individual does not
possess. This determination necessarily assumes a finding that an in-
dividual is already mentally defective, and that conclusion must be based
solely on I.Q.. The use of other tests to check the results of an I.Q. test
is practically nonexistent. At the Philadelphia County Court, only about
twenty per cent of suspected defective delinquents are given Rorschachs.
The Wechsler-Bellevue for either adult or children and a one to two hour
interview with a psychiatrist, together with a scrutinization of probation,
police and school reports is deemed adequate to achieve a proper diag-
nosis of defective delinquency. 22 It is interesting to note that the Dallas
111. Clarke, A.M., Criteria and Classification of Mental Deficiency in MENTAL
DEFIcIENcY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 54 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
112. Clarke, A.D.B., The Measurement of Intelligence: Its Validity and Reliability
in id. at 76-77.
113. GUTTMACHER & WEIHON, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 179 (1952).
114. Ibid.
115. "Psychological blocking" refers to a state of mind created by apprehension,
fear and surroundings at the time the tests are administered, which tends to make the
individual being tested perform below his true intelligence level. Interview with staff
at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
116. Gunzburg, Psychological Assessment in Mental Deficiency in MENTAL
DEFICIENCY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 272-87 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
117. See SCHN4IDMAN, THEMATIC TEST ANALYSIS (1951).
118. See Buck, HTP Technique (mono. Supp. - Univ. of Vt. 1954).
119. Supra note 116, at 277-78; GUTTMACH9R & W4IHOVEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 178 (1952).
120. Op. cit. supra note 117.
121. Gordon & Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the Defective Delinquent
Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. Rev. 459, 496 (1950).
122. Interview with Dr. Nicholas J. Frignito, Medical Director of Philadelphia
County Court, Oct. 25, 1966.
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staff feels that Philadelphia County does a superior job insofar as commit-
ment examinations and pre-sentence reports are concerned. Evidently,
there are many counties in the state that do not even meet the Philadel-
phia procedures. The only test administered at Dallas is the Minnesota
Mechanical, which measures hand-eye correlation and is used to determine
work placement.
Guttmacher and Weihofen agree with the general view of psychia-
trists that at no time does an I.Q. test or other psychological test alone
establish the diagnosis of mental deficiency. 123 The I.Q. should represent
the sine qua non of a diagnosis, but sufficient checks through other devices
should be utilized before such a consequential judgment is made. The
failure to use all of the available diagnostic methods necessary to a valid
diagnosis presents another example of the problems engendered by a
vague and broadly drawn statute. The lack of standards to guide the
psychiatrist in his examination concerning mental defectiveness and mental
instability have resulted in an unjust and unrealistic law. The statute as
it stands represents a threat to any individual falling below the normal
intelligence level, and is especially dangerous to those who fall within the
Borderline Defective Range of 70 to 80, where an overly exacting exam-
ination is necessary. "The importance of over-all clinical appraisal of
each case cannot be overemphasized. Judgments on criminality, intelligence
level, trainability, and instability are vital for accurate diagnosis. All four
characteristics must obtain for each case under consideration before diag-
nosis as a defective delinquent may be warranted."'1 24
The one statutory requirement not discussed thus far is that of "crim-
inal tendencies." To be subject to the statute, an individual must be men-
tally defective and have criminal tendencies.125 In view of the fact that the
statute does not provide a definition, this requirement could be the vaguest
segment of an already loosely drawn statute, and one that the courts
can easily gloss over in examining the definition. To be subject to the act,
an individual must be convicted of a crime, or if a juvenile, be adjudged
delinquent. 1 26 A court could possibly reason that this prerequisite is suf-
ficient to satisfy the criminal tendency requirement. The Dubois decision
followed this superficial type of analysis in interpreting "dangerous or
tendency to become such" in the similar Massachusetts statute.127 The
court defined "dangerous" by stating that "the term dangerous is com-
monly understood, when applied to a person, as meaning one likely to
cause or create danger.' 1 28 Obviously, the court decided to avoid major
definitional problems by entrusting this part of the definition to the trial
judge's discretion. This is a grossly unrealistic approach. Mr. Mack sug-
123. GUTTMACHIR & WEIHOFZN, op. cit. supra note 119, at 179.
124. Mack, supra note 99, at 5.
125. PA. STATr. ANN. fit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
126. Ibid.
127. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
128. Ex Parte Dubois, 331 Mass. 575, 580, 120 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1954).
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gests that a qualitative investigation should disclose habitual delinquent
tendencies on the individual's part, and that a first offender should be
subjected to careful study before being designated a defective delin-
quent. 129 Whereas the two psychologists on the staff at Dallas feel that
first offenders should be completely excluded from the definition.'3 0 While
the Defective Delinquent Act does not provide a cross reference to the
Mental Health Act, a look at the definition of criminal tendency as it
appears in that act is helpful in this regard.' 3' That definition states that
a criminal tendency is a: "[T] endency to repeat offenses against the law
or to perpetuate new offenses, as shown by repeated convictions for such
offenses or a tendency to habitual delinquency."
As yet we do not have sufficient diagnostic tools to predict the actions
of an individual in a particular situation,'3 2 or to effectively measure his
criminal tendencies. Our knowledge of the motivational factors and the
interplay of environmental and personality forces which continually cre-
ate unique situations is inadequate. Both psychologists at Dallas agreed
that at this time they could not adequately determine whether an individ-
ual would be a danger to society or possess criminal tendencies of a higher
degree than those possessed by a normal individual. 33
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Mr. Justice Holmes has characterized the equal protection challenge
as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."' 134 One would ex-
pect that a determination of the rationality of a legislative classification
would precede any procedural challenges, since a procedural attack would
be unnecessary if the classification were found to be unreasonable, but
the courts have been reluctant to invade the legislative sphere. It is a
maxim of constitutional law that a legislature is presumed to have acted
within constitutional limits, and courts are reluctant to hold that a legis-
lature has transcended its power.' 35 Furthermore, an individual assailing
a classification has the burden of showing that the legislation attacked
is arbitrary. 3 6 "In short, the selection in order to become obnoxious to
the fourteenth amendment, must be arbitrary and unreasonable; not mere-
ly possibly, but clearly and actually so. '' 137 But at the same time, the
United States Supreme Court has established its right to examine disputed
legislation and discover the fairness of its actual enforcement in terms of
129. Supra note 99, at 1.
130. Interview with Charles Pagana and Harry E. Russ, Jr., the two psychologists
at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1172 (1964).
132. Op. cit. supra note 116, at 291.
133. Supra note 130.
134. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
135. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v.
Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 (1899).
136. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
137. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41 (1907).
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the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 138 The Court
has also exercised this right in evaluating legislative classifications to
determine whether they are so unreasonable as to become discriminatory
in nature.13 9 Mr. Justice Matthews' classic formulation that, "The equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws,"'140 has
never been disturbed, but laws may classify, and classification in itself
is characteristic of inequality. The doctrine has therefore developed that
a statute must effect an unreasonable classification before it will be struck
down.141
Special legislation aimed at sex offenders, insane persons, the feeble-
minded, and in the instant situation, defective delinquents, stems from
the right of legislatures to classify certain groups and subject them to the
operation of a particular statute. Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the
Supreme Court in Barbier v. Connolly stated :142
[Nleither the [14th] amendment - broad and comprehensive as it
is - nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people. . . From the very necessities of society, legis-
lation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often
be had....
In Ex Parte Dubois the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the designation of mental defectives as a class over which the legis-
lature had not only the right, but also the duty to exercise supervision.143
In basing its decision on the state's responsibility to make provision for
the insane and the feebleminded, the court stated that, "The general power
of the Legislature, in its capacity as parens patriae, to make suitable pro-
vision for incompetent persons who are unable to take care of themselves
cannot be controverted.' 44 The Dubois court cited cases such as Sporza
v. German Savings Bank,145 which further defines the traditional type of
individual who has been subject to this type of special legislation, as
authority. In Sporza the New York Court of Appeals stated that :146
Jurisdiction is inherent in the state over unfortunate persons within
its limits who are idiots, or have been deprived of the use of their
mental facilities. It is its duty to protect the community from the
acts of those persons who are not under the guidance of reason, and
also to protect them, their persons, and property from their own dis-
ordered and insane acts.
138. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 420 (1894); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) ; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
139. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
140. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
141. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
Rtv. 341, 344 (1949).
142. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
143. 331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E2d 930 (1954).
144. Id. at 579-80, 120 N.E.2d at 922.
145. 92 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908).
146. Id. at 408. (Emphasis added.)
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The Dubois court failed to note any difference between the feebleminded
and insane individuals referred to in Sporza and the mentally defective
individual, despite the fact that the Massachusetts, as well as the Penn-
sylvania defective delinquent statute, specifically excludes the feebleminded
and the insane from its coverage, 14 7 and treats the mental defective quite
differently from the insane and feebleminded. The law usually excuses
feebleminded and insane persons from responsibility for their criminal
acts, whereas the defective delinquent is not so excused.148 In fact, under
the Pennsylvania statute, an individual must be convicted of a crime or
adjudged a delinquent before he is subject to the sanctions of the act.
The Sporza definition is therefore of little utility when applied to the
classification of mental defectives under the Pennsylvania Act. The men-
tal defective is not thought to need the prolonged custodial care required
for proper treatment of the feebleminded, but is institutionalized with
the goal of returning him to society as quickly as possible. 14 9 The defec-
tive delinquent, although retarded, is in most instances much closer to
the normal intelligence level than the feebleminded individual. He is
capable of acquiring basic skills and supporting himself in the commu-
nity if he receives adequate training and is able to achieve basic emotional
security. 1 0 Since the opening of the new institution for defective delin-
quents at Dallas in 1960, the average stay has been 2.8 years.
In view of the fact that the defective delinquent is treated quite dif-
ferently medically and legally than the insane and feebleminded offender,
a separate evaluation of the reasons for this special legislative classifica-
tion is a necessity. The equal protection clause requires that the legisla-
ture find a mentally deficient person who commits a crime more danger-
ous to the health and welfare of society than the normal individual who
commits a crime61 ' before it can subject him to a possible life sentence.
The Maryland Court of Appeals conducted this type of an examination
with regard to Maryland's defective delinquent statute in Director of
Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, and specifically found that the group of
persons falling within the definition did in fact constitute a danger to the
health and safety of the people. 152 As indicated in the first section of this
paper, the Maryland statute covers both the mentally deficient and the
emotionally unbalanced.'5 3 . The Pennsylvania statute, however, is limited
147. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3
(1964).
148. See Andriola, Some Suggestions for Treating the Defective Delinquent, 31
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 297 (1940); TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRrCTION 145
(1960).
149. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
150. Ibid.
151. See Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 121 A.2d 698 (1956), relied on by the
Daniels court, where the court stated that it had been a long established principle
that the State has the power to restrain the liberty of persons found dangerous to the
health and safety of the people.
152 ----- Md. __, 221 A.2d 397, 407 (1966).
153. See Robinson, In;titutions for Defective Delinquents, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
352 (1934), for a comparable New York law. For a discussion of the Maryland law,
see Boslow, Rosenthal & Gliedman, supra note 74.
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in application to the mentally deficient, and the staff at Dallas insists that
the group they are dealing with does not portray the symptoms of medi-
cally recognized psychiatric disorders that would necessitate the type of
care that a psychiatrically oriented institution such as Patuxent can pro-
vide. 54 The Daniels court based its decision solely on the emotional im-
balance segment of the definition; the language that it employed in defin-
ing that group that was found to be dangerous clearly demonstrates the
wide divergence between the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes:
[E]motional unbalance . . . [which] clearly constitute[s] an actual
danger to society . . . is generally understood . . . to refer to a
definite type of medically recognized psychiatric disorder manifested
by deep-seated emotional conflicts which distort the individual's atti-
tude toward society, and of society's attitude toward him, resulting
in an uncontrollable desire and need to create hostile acts against
society - this distortion or "characterological crippling" having
repetitive characteristics which the individual is incapable of con-
trolling and which, through mental mechanisms, impels him to carry
out such antisocial acts .... 155
Without expressing our opinion of the definition, it is sufficient to note
that the finding of mental disorder in Daniels places Maryland law in a
category with the law which resulted from decisions dealing with the
insane, the feebleminded and the sex-offender. 5 6
The Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act, viewed on its face, sub-
jects individuals who are mentally deficient and have committed a crime
or been adjudged delinquent to a possible life sentence, whereas the nor-
mal offender who commits the same offense is subject to the regular
statutory sentence. Some positive correlation must therefore exist be-
tween mental deficiency and criminality to justify this great disparity in
treatment. Early concepts of the retarded or feebleminded individual
characterized him as depraved and inherently inclined toward criminalistic
activities, 157 and the classical study of The Kallikak Family'58 depicted
the retarded individual in a constant state of degeneracy which was in-
herited and irreversible. But these theories have been discarded, and the
assumptions that mental deficiency is prevalent among the criminal popu-
lation, and that it creates a special correctional problem have also en-
countered opposition. 5 9 Blatt, points out that the most recent reports
relating delinquency and intelligence show low relationships. He feels
that lower I.Q. per se does not play an important role unless combined
with other factors such as continued school failures and poor homes, and
154. Supra note 149.
155. Md. _, _, 221 A.2d 397, 421 (1966).
156. Authority for Daniels in the sexual offender area was primarily derived fromState of Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270 (1940), and in the
other areas, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
157. FERNALD, THE BURDEN OP FEEBLEMINDEDNESS (1918).
158. GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY (1912).
159. See Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 1(1962).
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that delinquency cannot be explained as a manifestation of subnormality. 60
Tappan, in reviewing the latest literature, stated that: "The official data
indicate not only that defectives are a small minority among offenders
but also that their prison disciplinary records, their parole violation rates,
and their recidivism are very similar to those of offenders with normal
intelligence.' 6 1 Guttmacher and Weihofen present a slightly different
point of view. They recognize that studies have not shown an unusual
degree of recidivism among the intellectually defective, but it is Dr.
Guttmacher's clinical impression that both good and bad patterns of be-
havior become more set and stereotyped among defectives.' 62 Shulman,
however, reaffirms the view that the notion that mental deficients must
necessarily be behavior risks has been discarded.' 63 McCorkle adds that
even if it could be shown that there was some statistical correlation be-
tween low intelligence and crime, it has not been demonstrated that there
is any causal relationship, or that both are not due to other factors. 6 4
Tizard concludes that any difference between the I.Q.'s of delinquents
and non-delinquents can be attributed to cultural factors that adversely
affect test scores. 165
It is clear from the foregoing data that it is quite unreasonable to draw
a line between persons of low and normal intelligence when attempting
to determine the proper treatment of those convicted of a crime. In the
opinion of the authors, the Pennsylvania defective delinquent statute rep-
resents what Tussman and tenBroek have termed an "under-inclusive"
classification.' 6 6 That is, accepting their interpretation of the doctrine of
reasonable classification as one which includes all persons who are simi-
larly situated with respect to the purpose of the law,'1 7 a classification
which includes only a segment of the population tainted with the evil the
legislature is trying to combat would be under-inclusive and violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In applying this interpretation to the enactment of Pennsylvania's
statute, one would suppose that the state legislature concluded that many
of our offenders are recidivists, and that the mentally deficient offender
is more likely to repeat and presents a greater danger to society than the
normal offender. Thus, following the teachings of Truax v. Raich,168
160. Blatt, Some Persistent Recurring Assumptions Concerning the Mentally
Subnormal, 57 TRAINING SCHOOL BULL. 48, 49 (1960).
161. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 147-48 (1960). See MENTAL
DEFICIENcY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 173 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
162. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 180-81 (1952).
163. Shulman, Intelligence and Delinquency, 41 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 763 (1951).
164. McCORKLE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 265 (1959).
165. Tizard, Individual Differences in the Mentally Deficient in MENTAL DEFI-
CIENCY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 173 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
166. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 348 (1949).
167. Id. at 344.
168. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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which held that the equal protection clause does not prevent the legisla-
ture from recognizing "degrees of evil," and Atchison, Topeka & Sante
Fe R.R. v. Matthews,169 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a classi-
fication will be upheld "whenever such classification proceeds upon any
difference which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
accomplished," the legislature passed a statute which subjects mental
defectives who have criminal tendencies to a much longer sentence than
the normal offender who commits the same offense. The difference be-
tween offenders is the presence of a mental deficiency which, as we have
seen, is an illusory difference. 1 70 Since the normal offender is not included
within the classification, the statute does not include all who are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law. Thus, there is a prima
facie violation of the equal protection requirement of reasonable classi-
fication.
The Supreme Court accepted this same type of reasoning in over-
turning Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act in Skinner v.
Oklahoma stating: "When the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if
it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.' 71
The "strict scrutiny" that Mr. Justice Douglas calls for with regard to the
classification which a state makes in a sterilization law 172 is no less appli-
cable to the classification a state makes when it commits an individual
as a defective delinquent under an indeterminate sentence.17 3
Our equal protection analysis has thus far been concerned with the
Defective Delinquent Act as viewed on its face. If the criteria presented
as part of the mental instability segment 174 are read into the definition of
mental defective (though in our opinion a fair reading of the statute
prevents this), the equal protection challenge will be less effective. But
even though the courts might be able to find a reasonable classification in
an individual case based on a history of social maladjustment and delin-
quency, this approach would not dispel all problems. While many offenders
who come from low economic areas might be classified as mentally un-
stable on the basis of a history of delinquency, incorrigibility, and social
maladjustment, the chief factor differentiating them from the defective
delinquent would continue to be mental subnormality, and the equal pro-
tection clause would still present a classification problem.
169. 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
170. See notes 162-67 supra and accompanying text. A classification will not be
upheld if it rests on illusory differences, or if classificatory distinctions have little
relevance to the purpose for which the classifications are made. Walters v. City of St.
Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
171. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
172. Ibid.
173. Another possible equal protection challenge to the statute may arise from the
fact that the statute applies only to males, and not to females.
174. See notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
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V. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
DEFECTIVE DELINQUENT ACT
A. Adult
1. The Commitment Procedure. - Under the Defective Delinquent
Act,178 any male convicted of a crime or detained in any penal or correc-
tional institution under sentence may be committed to the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas.' 76 The prerequisite to a finding of mental deficiency
with "criminal tendencies" is a conviction.'7 7 The attention of the court
may be drawn to the potential mental defect of an individual while he
is before that court, by the warden, superintendent or the jail physician
of the correctional institution to which a convict has been sentenced, or
by any of the interested persons listed below.' 78 The court may order an
examination of the defendant's condition on its own motion, or on the
motion of the district attorney, the defendant, his counsel, or any "other
person acting for the defendant.' 179 While the court has the discretion
to raise the issue of a mental defect on its own motion, it must order
the statutory inquiry where other qualified parties have filed the appro-
priate petition.
The type of examination that is to be conducted is not described in
detail at any point in the statute, nor are the qualifications of the medical
personnel who are to conduct the inquiry defined nor the proper areas
of investigation indicated by the statute. The medical examiners are
required, however, to submit written findings, and are ordered to state their
conclusions as to whether or not the subject of their examination is "so
mentally defective and has criminal tendencies, whether or not coupled
with mental instability. . . ."80 No time period is specified for the length
or speed with which the examination should be conducted other than the
word "immediately."' 181 The court is free, once this pre-sentence report is
submitted, to summon other witnesses and hear additional evidence at its
discretion.' 82 The net effect of this procedure is a sentencing, and in some
cases, a resentencing proceeding that is purely discretionary. No hearing
need be held, nor is notice of the procedure with an opportunity to be
heard required by the statute. Under this procedure, it would be per-
fectly possible for a defendant who is under sentence and already committed
to one institution, to be re-examined and transferred to Dallas without
ever knowing why or how, and without having an opportunity to challenge
any of the evidence against him. Where someone had been convicted and
175. PA. STAar. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-1 (1964).
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
177. Ibid.
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid.
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was awaiting sentence, defense counsel would not be able to force a sen-
tencing hearing, and the court might possibly commit an individual for an
examination and order his commitment to Dallas directly after the report
of the doctors was submitted. There is no right to a hearing under the
statute, and unless there was a clear abuse of discretion, it would be
difficult to imagine an appellate court ordering one. Thus, it is possible,
at least theoretically, that a convict will be sentenced in secret, without
ever coming before a judge again.
2. Procedural Safeguards. - Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez v.
Maroney' 83 requires that a lawyer be available to the defendant during his
sentencing hearing, since it is the last critical stage of the proceeding where
counsel may be of real assistance to both the defendant and the court.
But if a sentencing hearing is not required or even provided for, what
role can counsel have? There is no provision in the Defective Delinquent
Act that permits the examination of the report of the medical examiner
by defense counsel, or even the District Attorney nor is there any adequate
way of checking or contradicting the medical diagnosis, since the statute
provides no guidelines or definitions of mental defectiveness or criminal
tendency. Yet, as has been shown earlier in this paper,'8 4 the finding of
mental defect coupled with criminal tendency is a new issue of fact. In
Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Keenan,'85 a case involving a second
offender under the Drug Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared
that: "The trial court may not rely upon its own record to come to its
own conclusion on the fact of recidivism without the convict's knowledge
of what is taking place.' 8 6 The court had held in an earlier case involving
the Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act, that an increase in a sentence
because of repeated offenses may not be made until the defendant has had
an opportunity to be heard after appropriate notice. 1 87 Thus, the deter-
mination of the new issue of recidivism or, in the case of the defective
delinquent, mental defect coupled with criminal tendencies, requires a
separate judicial determination with notice to the defendant and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. The present Defective Delinquent Act is seriously
lacking in this regard. Unless the courts are willing to "read in" this
provision as a necessary part of the statutory proceeding, the law patently
offends Pennsylvania as well as federal notions of due process. This deter-
mination does not turn on whether the statute is civil or penal in nature,
since the United States Supreme Court has held that these procedural
safeguards are basic to the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process,
regardless of the nature of the proceeding.' 88
183. 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964).
184. See notes 36-43 supra and accompanying text.
185. 195 Pa. Super. 188, 171 A.2d 895 (1961).
186. Id. at 190, 171 A.2d at 897.
187. See Commonwealth ex rel. Deremendzin v. Myers, 397 Pa. 596, 156 A.2d 804
(1959). See also U.S. ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624, 628 (3d Cir. 1953).
188. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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In September 1966, Judge Stanley Greenberg of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas held that a commitment to Farview under the
Mental Health Act, albeit civil, nevertheless required the appointment of
counsel for the defendant if he was unable to afford it :189
It would be less than fair to hold that an accused is entitled to counsel
at a trial, but not at a hearing where the results and consequences to
him could be much more serious. This is especially true when the
hearing concerns his mental capacity. In such a proceeding it is
obvious that a man is even less able to cope with the so-called intri-
cacies and technicalities than in the ordinary situation, and, thus,
requires the assistance of counsel even more.
The new Mental Health Act which became effective January 1, 1967 pro-
vides for the presence of counsel at the sanity hearing and at the com-
petency hearing prior to commitment. Thus, it would seem that Judge
Greenberg's position has been recognized by the legislature in enacting the
new law. In view of the general treatment of the mentally defective criminal
as someone between the normal and the insane offender, it would appear
that the same rationale should apply in the case of a commitment to Dallas.
The right to counsel at a judicial determination of mental defect is as
critical as an appearance before a Lunacy Commission, and the long-range
effects may well be the same, since both may result in indeterminate
commitments. Furthermore, if the analysis made earlier in this paper with
regard to the penal nature of the defective delinquent statute is accepted
as valid, the sixth and fourteenth amendments require that counsel be made
available to the defendant as a matter of right.190
Should notice to the defendant, an opportunity to be heard and a
right to counsel be provided under any of the several theories which might
be relevant, it is difficult to determine what role counsel can play. The
pre-sentence report of the medical examiners need only contain conclu-
sions. Assuming that I.Q., as the outer limit of mental deficiency, is
definable and subject to accurate scientific measurement, the lawyer's role
simply consists of presenting another set of psychometric tests to challenge
the findings of the doctors. Of course, this presumes that the report of
the medical examiners would be made available to the defendant's counsel.
There is at present a continuing controversy over the confidentiality of the
pre-sentence report. Williams v. New York, 191 a case involving the im-
position of the death penalty in the face of a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment, held that the court had not violated due process by failing
to disclose the contents of the pre-sentence report to defense counsel.
Psychiatrists urging the non-disclosure of the reports have asserted that
revelation of conditions or findings may be harmful to the morale of the
189. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Shovlin, __ Pa. D.&C.2d -_ (C.P. Phila.,
opinion unpublished, filed Sept. 8, 1966).
190. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
191. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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patient and retard any improvement in his condition. 192 They assert that
a pre-sentence report is generally made with the sole purpose of informing
the conscience of the judge, and that it is not necessary that it meet the
ordinary rules of evidence regarding hearsay and testimony under oath. 193
It is also feared that revelation of the sources of information will dry
up the sources and create a reluctance on the part of informers to give
information. But it would seem that, in the area of psychometric testing,
the availability of defense counsel and his ability to bring other evidence to
light to challenge the findings of the medical report would only increase
the capacity of the court to arrive at a proper determination. In the final
analysis, it is the judge who must determine whether a mental deficiency
and a criminal tendency exists. In addition, the court must be "satisfied
that person thought to be mentally defective is not insane, nor can be
classified as an idiot or imbecile by recognized psychological tests nor a
psychopath or an infirmary case. .... -194 A judge will certainly be better
able to discharge this weighty responsibility if all relevant data and
information is available for his scrutiny.
The argument that disclosure of the doctors' findings will harm the
morale of the defendant can be disposed of easily. Should the report be
made available to defense counsel, as an officer of the court as well as an
advocate for the defendant, he would be able to assist both parties. There
is no need to disclose the complete contents, or even a part, of the testing
record to the defendant. No potential doctor-patient relationship would be
impaired, since the doctors who make the examination are not the same
men who will be treating the defendant if he is in fact found to be a
defective delinquent -and sent to Dallas. Moreover, since the staff at
Dallas report that one of the most difficult tasks they face with each new
commitment is explaining to a prisoner why he is called a "defective
delinquent,"19 5 it might be desirable not to disclose the contents of the
report to the defendant. The prisoners understand the delinquency aspect
if they have committed a crime, but they do not understand, and are in
fact upset, by the appellation "defective.'1 9 There is, in the minds of these
people, as well as in the rest of the population, a stigma attached to the
word "defective" which is not associated with the words "mentally re-
tarded." Yet, the staff at Dallas state that mental defect and mental
retardation are basically similar and, in fact, could not distinguish between
the two.
97
Another aspect of the medical report which is of grave concern is the
finding of a criminal tendency by the examiners. There are no statutory
definitions or guidelines which indicate what is meant by criminal tendency.
A reliable prediction of the criminal activity of a normal offender is
192. KssVE, Tns PROBATION OFFICZR INVESTIGATES 10 (1960).
193. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
195. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid.
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extremely difficult, and this task becomes practically impossible where a
mentally retarded individual is involved because of the inadequacy of
projective tests in treating these offenders.'9 8 Conviction of one crime does
not necessarily prove a criminal tendency. If it did, there would be no need
to make an additional finding on the issue; conviction of a crime would be
sufficient in itself to justify a commitment to Dallas. But, if a mental defi-
ciency and a criminal conviction will not suffice, what standards are
doctors to use in determining whether a criminal tendency exists? The
critical and necessarily vague finding of a criminal tendency by the medical
examiners must be open to challenge and scrutiny by opposing counsel.
For this reason also, the pre-sentence examination made by the appointed
doctors must be made available to counsel. At present the doctors need
only state their conclusion; the sources or diagnostic bases they used to
arrive at their findings need not appear in their report. The weight which
was given to any number of factors and their relevancy to the entire
consideration will never be known, and a judge has no way of checking
the examiners' results. He may call in other witnesses and ask for more
evidence, but even he is without a guide as to what the statute means by
"criminal tendencies."
In view of the statutory weakness of the Defective Delinquent Act on
definitional grounds and the penal nature of proceedings under it,199 it
becomes apparent that the procedural safeguards required by the Third
Circuit in Barr-Walker proceedings are equally requisite to proceedings
under the Defective Delinquent Act. In Gerchman, the court held that the
assistance of counsel and the right to confront and cross-examine the doctors
who made the findings of sexual psychopathy, as well as others who par-
ticipated in the drafting of the pre-sentence report, was necessary if due
process was to be afforded to a convict under examination. 20 0 The Third
Circuit did not decide whether a jury trial was required on the issue of
sexual psychopathy, although the issue was raised. Both the Maryland
Defective Delinquent Act,20 1 and the Massachusetts Act provide for such
a right on the issue of defective' delinquency. 20 2
3. Maryland and Massachusetts Practice. - Having considered what the
Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act actually provides in the way of
procedural safeguards, and proposing what appears to be required con-
stitutionally, we turn to a brief consideration of Maryland and Massachu-
setts laws on this subject. Maryland defines a defective delinquent much
more specifically than Pennsylvania, 20 3 and limits the definition by enumer-
198. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
199. See supra, section I.
200. United States ex rel: Gerchman v. Maroney, 335 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
201. MD. ANN. COD art. 31B, § 8(c) (Supp. 1966).
202. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
203. MD. ANN. CoDm art. 31B, § 5 (Supp. 1966) which states that:
For the purposes of this article, a defective delinquent shall be defined as an
individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or
criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both,
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ating the category of convicted offenses which must have been committed
before a request for an examination may be made.20 4 The request may only
be made if there has been conviction and sentence for:
(1) a felony; (2) a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary; (3) a crime of violence; (4) a sex crime involving:(A) Physical force or violence, (B) disparity of age between an
adult and a minor, or (C) a sexual act of an uncontrolled and/or
repetitive nature; (5) two or more convictions for any offenses or
crimes punishable by imprisonment, in a criminal court of this State.205
The court may request the examination of its own motion, or upon a
written petition of the prosecuting State's attorney, the defendant, his
counsel, or the Department of Correction which states -the reasons for
suspicion of defective delinquency.206 The court is not required to issue
an order for an examination, but may do so at its discretion. 20 7 This
procedure differs significantly from the Pennsylvania procedure, which
provides that the judge shall order the inquiry upon petition without any
reasons being alleged. 20 8 Under the Maryland statute requests for examina-
tion may be made any time after conviction and sentence to a penal
institution, so long as the person involved is then serving or will begin
to serve that sentence. 20
9
In Massachusetts, the district attorney may petition for commitment at
"any time prior to the final disposition of a case in which a defendant ...
is charged with a crime, other than murder, the commission of which
creates a danger to life or limb .... 210 The definition of defective delin-
quent is not specifically set forth in any one section, but in reading several
pertinent sections together, it becomes clear that the statute requires a
charge of a violent crime against a person, a finding of mental deficiency
based on psychometric and psychological tests, and a finding of present or
potential dangerousness to the public.211 The statute imposes no require-
ment of conviction and sentence. Pennsylvania requires at least a conviction.
Once a petition for commitment has been filed, the court must order the
examination; the reasons for the request need not be stated.212 There is
no provision which permits the court to cause this examination to be
made upon its own motion.
The Maryland statute empowers the court to order an examinee to
be transferred from the Department of Correction to Patuxent (the insti-
as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such con-
finement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and treatment.
204. Mn. ANN. Cong art. 31B, § 6(a) (Supp. 1966).
205. Ibid.
206. Mn. ANN. COD. art. 31B, §§ 6(b), 6(d) (Supp. 1966).
207. MD. ANN. Cong art. 31B, § 6(b) (Supp. 1966). (The original statute made
such a hearing mandatory.)
208. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
209. Mn. ANN. Cong art. 31B, § 6(c) (Supp. 1966).
210. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
211. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 113, 115 (1965).
212. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
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tution for the defective delinquent) until a diagnosis is completed, even
though his original sentence might expire during that time,213 while Massa-
chusetts limits the examination period to thirty-five days in a defective
delinquent department.214 The Pennsylvania statute, on the other hand,
gives no indication as to which department the examinee should be com-
mitted or where he is to be examined, nor does it impose a time limitation,
other than the requirement that the examination is to be conducted
"immediately. '215  Maryland requires that a psychiatrist, a psychologist
and a medical physician examine the convict, but requires only a majority
opinion to diagnose mental deficiency. 216 The time limit for the Maryland
examination is unusual - the diagnosis must be completed no later than
six months following the examinee's entry into Patuxent or before the
expiration of his sentence, whichever last occurs.217 Thus, if a convict
had two years to serve before his sentence were up, he might be confined
to Patuxent for two years in order to diagnose the presence or absence of
mental deficiency. During that time, he would not have been committed
as a defective delinquent, since the court would not have made a finding
on that issue, nor would the procedure provided by statute have been
exhausted. This could work great inequity on the examinee and might
result in an abuse of his constitutional rights if it should turn out that
he was not in fact a mental defective. 218
The Maryland statute provides that notice be given to the person to
be examined. 219 If anyone other than the convict or his attorney has
requested the examination, the examinee is entitled to be examined by
his own psychiatrist at state expense. 220 A copy of that psychiatrist's report
is submitted to the court.2 21 If the report of the Institution indicates de-
fective delinquency, the' court notifies the defendant, tells him of the
substance of the report, advises him of his right to counsel, and apprises
him that a hearing on the issue of defective delinquency will be held.222
If the defendant cannot provide his own counsel, the court must appoint
counsel for him.223 Counsel for both sides have access "to all records,
reports and papers of the institution relating to the person, and to all
papers, in the possession of the court, bearing upon the person's case,
including a copy of the report of the institution. '224 The hearing must
take place no less than thirty days after the appointment of counsel unless
defense counsel requests acceleration of the hearing date.225 Either side
213. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(e) (Supp. 1966).
214. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
215. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
216. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 7(a) (Supp. 1966).
217. Ibid.
218. Dennison v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 933, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. CI. 1966); People
ex rel. Cirrone v. Hoffman, 255 App. Div. 404, 8 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1938).
219. MD. ANN. CoD art. 31B, § 6(b) (Supp. 1966).
220. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, § 7(b) (Supp. 1966).
221. Ibid.
222. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 8(a) (Supp. 1966).
223. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, §§ 8(a)-(b) (Supp. 1966).
224. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, § 8(b) (Supp. 1966).
225. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, § 8(c) (Supp. 1966).
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may request a jury trial, at which the jury will be directed to reach a
special verdict on the issue of defective delinquency.226
In Massachusetts, two psychiatrists appointed by the Commissioner
of Mental Health conduct the examination. 227 If these experts find that
commitment is necessary, they must issue a certificate stating that, based
upon their diagnosis the examinee is mentally defective. 228 This report
is to be filed with the court clerk within thirty-five days and is available
to ,the probation officer, the district attorney, defense counsel and the
defendant himself.229 Upon the submission of a certification of mental
defectiveness, the court must issue a written notice to the examinee
informing him that a hearing will be held on his possible commitment to
a defective delinquent department. 230 There is no provision for a trial by
jury in the hearing procedure. The court must also examine the record,
"character and personality of such person," look for indications of his
dangerousness to the public, either extant or potential, with a view toward
determining whether he is feebleminded or insane.231 If the requisite
dangerous characteristics are felt to be present, and the examinee is not
found to be feebleminded or insane, the court must report him to be a
defective delinquent and commit him to the appropriate defective delinquent
department. Such a commitment constitutes a final disposition of the
crime for which he was charged, and he cannot be tried again for that
crime.23 2 The order of commitment is a final appealable order.
It is apparent from the outset, that both Maryland and Massachusetts
differ markedly from Pennsylvania in the procedural safeguards they pro-
vide for the defective delinquent. Pennsylvania does not require a hearing,
does not require notice of possible commitment or an opportunity to be
heard, does not provide a measurable definition, does not provide for
counsel, either appointed or voluntary, and does make the report of the
medical examiners available to anyone but the court. And the procedural
steps that are laid down so carefully in both Maryland and Massachusetts
are totally lacking in the Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act. It is
easy to see why the procedural challenges hurled at the Maryland and
Massachusetts statutes were dismissed as being without foundation in Sas
v. Maryland 3 and Ex Parte DuBois.234 Yet both of these statutes present
certain difficulties.
One of the great difficulties with the Maryland statute lies in the
potential for abuse found in administrative transfers and indeterminate
sentences. The Maryland Constitution specifically provides for the impo-
226. Ibid.
227. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
228. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 115 (1965).
229. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid.
233. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964). See also Director of Patuxent Institution v.
Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
234. 331 Mass. 575, 130 N.E.2d 920 (1954).
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sition of indeterminate sentences on persons convicted of crimes.23 5 Fur-
thermore, Patuxent is so hybridized that it is not easily characterized as
a prison, but may fall into the traditional category of a civil institution
which can properly receive persons for indeterminate terms. The rationale
for the indeterminate term in a civil situation is that commitment is for
the protection and possible cure of the insane or feebleminded person, and
the stigma is not the same as that involved when an individual is penalized
by being incarcerated in a penitentiary for a given number of years. If a
person is insane, he is not being sent to jail forever, but is being hospitalized
for his own good and for the good of the community. Maryland specifically
requires that an indeterminate sentence to Patuxent be imposed once a
finding of defective delinquency has been made.23 6 If the person is com-
mitted to Patuxent while under a definite sentence, credit must be given
for time served in Patuxent.237 No original committment may be made
to Patuxent if the criminal sentence has expired. But if a petition for
commitment as a defective delinquent is filed before termination of the
sentence, the fact that the sentence has expired will not void the Patuxent
commitment if defective delinquency is found. The possibility of administra-
tive transfers appears in this context, since a "problem" case in one prison
could be transferred to Patuxent on the eve of release. Once a convict is
found to be a defective delinquent, his original sentence is suspended, and
he is no longer confined for any of the original sentence.238 In view of
the great number of procedural safeguards available to the defendant under
the Maryland statute, it would appear that Baxstrom v. Herold23 9 would
not vitiate this aspect of the commitment, since that case was concerned
with a finding of defectiveness after sentence has expired, a finding which
Maryland law clearly prohibits.
The Massachusetts statute provides that institutions for defective
delinquents are a part of the state's penal system or state farm schools.240
The statute makes no specific provision for indeterminate sentences, but
it would appear to permit them, since once committed to a defective delin-
quent department, an individual remains committed until he is no longer
deemed to be a defective delinquent.241 If a convict recovers during the
pendency of his original sentence, he may be returned to the penal institu-
tion from which he was committed and given credit for the time spent
in the defective delinquent department. 242
235. MD. CONST. art. III, § 60.
236. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 9(b) (Supp. 1966).
237. Ibid.
238. Ibid.
239. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The Court held that permitting the civil commitment
of a convict at the end of his penal sentence without providing the jury trial available
to all other persons civilly committed violated the equal protection clause. In addition,
the Court required that a full determination of criminal insanity be made before com-
mitting a person to a mental institution maintained by the Department of Correction.
240. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 117, 117A (1965).
241. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 117A, 115 (1965).
242. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 117A (1965).
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Pennsylvania transferred the control of the defective delinquent from
the Department of Welfare to the Department of Justice in 1953,243 and
the Department of Justice was given complete power to make transfers to
and from all institutions under its control in furtherance of the purposes
of the defective delinquent statute.24 4 We have already seen that the
wardens or medical personnel of any of the industrial schools, jails or
penal institutions of the state may request an inquiry into a given inmate's
possible mental defectiveness. By the simple device of a written petition
and two friendly doctors who are willing to find mental deficiency and
criminal tendencies, the various prisons and state correctional institutions
can rid themselves of troublemakers or other misfits by dumping them
at Dallas. Since the power to make transfers and retransfers is specifically
granted to the Department of Justice, commitment could be accomplished
at the administrative level and the court might never enter into the pro-
ceeding at all. The potential for abuse inherent in this procedure is obvious,
and can only be corrected by writing appropriate procedural safeguards
into the statute.
5. Review and Release Procedures. - The Pennsylvania statute in-
dicates that if a convict is transferred to Dallas from another institution in
the correctional system, he will be given credit for time served at Dallas
once he has recovered from his defective delinquency. 243 In the event
commitment to Dallas occurs before a sentence has been imposed, the
time served at Dallas will be deemed to be in lieu of sentence, and the
inmate will remain in Dallas pending further "order of the court. '246
These provisions taken in toto result in an indeterminate sentence, since
release from Dallas may only occur when there is evidence that the in-
mate's mental condition has improved, that his release would be "bene-
ficial and not incompatible with the welfare of society .. ,"247 and that
an appropriate plan has been worked out and approved for him.
248 If
a convict is sentenced for a specific term in another institution and later
transferred to Dallas, he may be detained until he recovers even if his
sentence should expire before that time.249 The validity of this particular
provision seems highly questionable today in light of Baxstrom v. Herold,250
since no provision is made for a new judicial determination of a convict's
mental defectiveness. The responsibility for determining whether a con-
vict has recovered is not detailed in the statute, and no procedure is laid
down for periodic review of his case to determine if he has or has not
.243. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.2 (1964).
244. PA. STrAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.3 (1964).
245. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
246. Ibid.
247. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-9 (1964).
248. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 80 Pa. D.&C. 379 (Fay County Juv. Ct. 1951).
A mental defective who was convicted of rape and engaged in acts of sodomy while at
Huntingdon would not be released on petition where supervisory arrangements have
not been made and medical opinion advises supervision.
249. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-6 (1964).
250. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See 12 VILL. L. Rzv. 178 (1966).
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recovered. No specific type of re-examination is required; no tests need
be administered; and no one appears to be required to keep the court
posted as to why a convict has not recovered, or why it has been deter-
mined that he has not recovered. The potential for abuse is overwhelming,
and there are currently inmates at Dallas whose continued commitment
is due to the failure of the statute to provide procedures for the periodic
review of their mental condition, as well as adequate release procedures. 251
In addition to the inadequacies mentioned above, it should be noted
that there is no mandatory judicial or administrative review, nor any
right of appeal from a finding of mental defectiveness provided for in the
Pennsylvania statute. This situation is in marked contrast to that which
obtains in Maryland and Massachusetts. Maryland provides that after a
two year confinement in Patuxent, which must be at least equal to two-
thirds of his original sentence a convict may petition for review of his
status as a defective delinquent.252 The review procedure provides for a
right to counsel, a jury trial, and the use of process to compel the appear-
ance of witnesses. 255 If this hearing results in a finding that he is no
longer defective, an inmate may be released or recommitted for the balance
of his original sentence, with a credit being given for time spent at
Patuxent.2 5 4 Once this right to a review has been exercised, a convict is
not entitled to a review again for three years255 (if he is still a defective
delinquent.) The statute makes specific provision for the right to habeas
corpus, 256 and also provides for a right of appeal from the original commit-
ment and the review proceeding.257
Massachusetts permits an appeal from the original commitment to
the superior criminal court and provides for a trial by jury at the appel-
lant's request.2 5 8 Within one year after commitment as a defective de-
linquent, and at least once every three years thereafter, every person com-
mitted as a defective delinquent must be examined by two psychiatrists
appointed by the commissioner of mental health, and their written report
turned over to the commissioner of correction.2 59 If an inmate is found
not to be mentally defective, he must be taken before the probate court
"for discharge from defective delinquent status. ' 260 When a person who
has been transferred into a defective delinquent department from another
penal institution improves to such an extent as to permit his return to that
institution, he may be transferred back and given a credit against his
sentence for the time served in the institution for defective delinquents.2 6'
251. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
252. MD. ANN. CoDz art. 31B, § 10(a) (Supp. 1966). This means that on a six
year sentence, review can only be had after four years at Patuxent.
253. Ibid.
254. Ibid.
255. MD. ANN. Com1 art. 31B, § 10(b) (Supp. 1966).
256. MD. ANN. CODx art. 31B, § 10(c) (Supp. 1966).
257. MD. ANN. CODe art. 31B, §§ 11, 11(a) (Supp. 1966).
258. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
259. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 118 (1965).
260. Ibid.
261. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 117A (1965).
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Thus far, we have examined many of the aspects of commitment,
transfer, review, and appeal involved in defective delinquent statutes of
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Massachusetts. The final consideration under
this section will be concerned with release procedures. Under the Penn-
sylvania law, release occurs only when the Board is of the opinion that
there has been improvement in the mental condition of the inmate to the
extent that his "release will be beneficial and not incompatible with the
welfare of society .... ,,262 If the Board at Dallas feels that release is
warranted, it must notify the Department of Welfare263 which may rec-
ommend discharge to the committing court. If discharge is recommended,
the case record, along with the case history compiled at Dallas, and the
opinion of the superintendent and physician or psychiatrist as to the
inmate's mental condition is to be forwarded to the court. 2 4 At this stage,
the court has the discretion after hearing "all persons desirous of being
heard,' 265 to issue an order releasing the defendant or returning him to
court for probation or parole.2 6 It should be noted that a hearing must
be held before the inmate may be released, although no such "requirement"
exists for his commitment.
Commonwealth v. Johnson267 indicates that no release may be ordered
unless a plan which meets the recommendations of the Dallas staff is
formulated, particularly with reference to sexual offenders. The Dallas
staff are particularly sensitive to homosexual tendencies in their inmates
and have held up release proceedings where any evidence of homosexual
conduct appears.2 68 In some cases, the plan can never be approved be-
cause there is no state or private agency or family able or willing to take
on the job of supervision. Thus, some potential release cases are detained
in Dallas indefinitely for want of an adequate plan. Fifteen inmates were
released from Dallas in June and July, 1966, by President Judge Adrian
Bonnelly of the Philadelphia County Court. They had been detained there
far in excess of the legally permissible time, but were not released because
it was felt that they would be unable to function in the community on their
own.2 6 9 These inmates are currently in custody at the Philadelphia House
of Detention; action has just been taken to have them committed to a state
mental hospital under the new Mental Health Act.2 70 The "plan" aspect
of the release procedure is greatly dependent upon existing community
facilities, which appear to be sorely lacking. The Staff at Dallas has spoken
262. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-9 (1964).
263. Although the institution is under the Department of Justice, the release pro-
cedure still refers to the Department of Welware. Since the Department of Justice
took over in 1953, it is probably the appropriate place to which Board recommendations
should go.
264. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-9 (1964).
265. Ibid.
266. Ibid.
267. 80 Pa. D.&C. 379 (Fay County Juv. Ct. 1951).
268. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
269. Records of inmates on file at the office of the American Civil Liberties Union
in Philadelphia.
270. The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 7, 1967, p. 17, col. 20.
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highly of the Jason School in Philadelphia, which will take inmates recom-
mended for release by the Dallas staff.2 71 Those who were released from
Dallas last June because of legal technicalities would probably not be can-
didates for the Jason School.
In view of the fact that the section of the statute dealing with inde-
terminate commitment provides for release upon "further order of the
court, '272 one would assume that the court, in exercising its continuing
jurisdiction over a case, might want to review the mental condition of
an inmate periodically and consider releasing him without the recommen-
dation of the Board at Dallas. This is indeed possible, but it has not
worked out this way in practice. The responsibility for the "forgotten
men" must be borne as much by the courts as the legislature and the
community at large. The families of many of these inmates are eager
to rid themselves of difficult and often embarrassing problems, and the
courts are satisfied to have them off the streets. Until the recent furor
generated by the activities of the Philadelphia Chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union, no one gave much thought as to how long or why
these men were in Dallas. Still, in preparing plans for release, the Staff
at Dallas are largely left to their own devices in setting up employment
situations and guardian programs, since the Parole Board has no jurisdic-
tion over Dallas inmates .2 3 The lack of access to the already perfected
contacts and channels for community services which the Parole Board
has built up through years of practice is a crippling blow to the already
meager forces at Dallas engaged in the job of replacement. Great credit
must be given to the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation for its tremen-
dous efforts in behalf of inmates at Dallas.2 7 4 Bearing in mind that it is
difficult enough to place a skilled normal convict in employment in the
community, how much greater is the difficulty where a minimally skilled,
mentally retarded offender is involved?
As previously noted, release procedures under the Pennsylvania
statute do provide for a hearing. Thus, an attorney should be able to
effectively provide information and assistance to the court and Dallas
staff in working out an appropriate plan for the inmate. The availability
of community services and the willingness of the attorney to serve his
client in this area can only serve to strengthen the entire basis for the
specialized defective delinquent commitment. But if no attorney may be
present to fight for his client's release and assist in the preparation of a
meaningful and workable plan, Dallas becomes nothing more than a
dumping ground. It then becomes simply a matter of luck as to who
makes it to the outside world again - a fact of life which can have very
demoralizing effects even on the mentally retarded.
271. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
272. PA. SvAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
273. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
274. Ibid.
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No provision is made in the Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act
for the utilization of the work-release program or of weekend paroles or
probations. The Maryland statute, on the other hand, specifically pro-
vides for a release on parole, or "a leave of absence," not to exceed one
year, which may or may not be coupled with employment conditions and
which may be revoked at any time.275 This parole may result in a full
discharge or serve as the basis for a convict's return to his original sen-
tence, depending upon the court's order.276 The release period may be
amended or revoked at any time.2 7 7 Under the Massachusetts statute,
once the two psychiatrists find that the inmate is no longer mentally de-
fective, and he has been discharged from his delinquency status by the
probate court, he is free.278 There is no provision for work release or
probation during the period of confinement. The only situation in which
a defective delinquent is not freed when his status is changed occurs when
he has been committed during sentence from another institution and must
be returned to that institution to serve the balance of his time there.279
In summing up the treatment of adult offenders under the defective
delinquent acts, we must conclude that the Pennsylvania Defective De-
linquent Act contains almost no procedural safeguards and is open to
the greatest abuse. The inadequacies of the Pennsylvania statute in this
area are so pronounced that they offend all notions of due process and
fair play, regardless of whether the statute is viewed as being civil or
penal in nature. The Maryland statute, by contrast, provides the needed
procedural safeguards and a highly flexible and progressive program
which is closer to hospitalization than incarceration. If one were to sum
up the Maryland and Pennsylvania approaches, one could say that the
approach at Patuxent is largely directed toward rehabilitation, while
Dallas is primarily a custodial institution which deemphasizes treatment
of the defective delinquent at every turn.
B. Juvenile
1. Jurisdiction over the Juvenile. - The treatment of the juvenile
offender under the Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent Act, which covers
males from the age of fifteen and upward,28 0 raises problems of a much
different nature than some of those considered under the section on adults.
Responsibility for the commitment of juvenile delinquents to Dallas rests
in Juvenile Courts of the various counties by virtue of the Juvenile Court
Act, which gives those courts jurisdiction over children under eighteen
years of age.28 ' That Act specifically provides that children who are under
275. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, §§ 13(d)-(e) (Supp. 1966).276. MD. ANN. CODS art. 31B, § 13(f) (Supp. 1966).
277. MD. ANN. CODe art. 31B, § 13(d) (Supp. 1966).
278. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 118 (1965).
279. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 117A (1965).
280. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
281. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(2) (1964).
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the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court are not to acquire civil disabilities
imposed by virtue of the criminal law, nor are they to "be deemed con-
victed of crime. '28 2 Chief Justice Stern of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated the underlying rationale for the Juvenile Court in Holmes'
Appeal: 2 83
The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature of a criminal
trial but constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the
treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their
purpose is not penal but protective, - aimed to check juvenile de-
linquency and to throw around a child, just starting perhaps, on an
evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the strong arm of
the State acting as parens patriae. The State is not seeking to punish
an offender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming
one, and to safeguard his adolescent life. Even though the child's
delinquency may result from the commission of a criminal act the
State extends to such a child the same care and training as to one
merely neglected, destitute or physically handicapped. No suggestion
or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a
Juvenile Court.
In keeping with this approach to the juvenile delinquent, the statute
provides that children under the age of sixteen are not to be housed in
any jail or other penal institution in which adults are also confined before
or after a hearing on their delinquency. 284 Special accommodations, sep-
arate and apart, must be established for the detention of juveniles. Yet
Dallas may receive people from the age of fifteen years and up, and there
is no provision in that institution for clear separation between juveniles
and adults. Thus, there is potential conflict between the concept of a
Juvenile Court that is on guard to provide special facilities for the treat-
ment and rehabilitation of the juvenile offender, and the State Correc-
tional Institution at Dallas which is a maximum security prison 2 5 that
places greater emphasis on custody than treatment. Chief Justice Stern's
analysis of the Juvenile Court rests on the notion that certain procedural
safeguards apply only in criminal proceedings, and that since the Juvenile
Court hearing is civil in nature, the safeguards are unnecessary. To the
Chief Justice the juvenile proceeding is in the interest of the child, and
not against his welfare. While this rationale is certainly valid when
applied to a civil institution that is geared to rehabilitation and retrain-
ing, it is clearly invalid where the institution involved is a prison which
is run for the purpose of keeping criminals off the street for as long as
their peculiar mental condition exists.
2. Procedural Safeguards. - In 1966, the Supreme Court shed new
light on the need for procedural safeguards in the Juvenile Courts. Kent
v. United States2 6 involved the certification of a boy from the jurisdic-
282. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 261 (1964).
283. 379 Pa. 599, 603-04, 190 A.2d 523, 525 (1954).
284. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 249 (1964).
285. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 185 Pa. Super. 136, 138 A.2d 140 (1958).
286. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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tion of the juvenile court to the criminal courts of the District of Colum-
bia; no hearing on the issue of the Juvenile Court's waiver of jurisdiction
was held. In finding that a requirement for a hearing on the issue of
waiver could be read into the statute the Court said:
In these circumstances, considering particularly that decision as to
waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the matter to the District Court
was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between
five years' confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as
a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a
hearing .... 287
A comparison of the possible consequences to the juvenile that may
result from a finding of defective delinquency, with the possible harm
that might result from his certification over to a criminal court, reveals
that the former is potentially the more damaging. If a juvenile were
properly certifiable to a criminal court on criminal charges, the proof and
procedure employed in that court would have to be in accord with the
constitutional guarantees of the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amend-
ments as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. If
found guilty, he would be sentenced to the specified statutory term just
as if he were an adult. On the other hand, if a juvenile were adjudged a
delinquent under the Juvenile Court Act and examined by the appropriate
medical committee to detect mental defectiveness, he would run the risk
of being thrown into prison for an indeterminate term, or at least until
he was twenty-one, without any process to protect or assist him. This
radical change in status results not only from the fact that he would be
incarcerated in a penal institution with adult convicts in violation of the
Juvenile Court Act, but also from the fact that he would no longer be
under the rehabilitative supervision of the Juvenile Court. With the
exception of the discretion in the Juvenile Court to certify juveniles who
have allegedly committed murder or who are between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen to the criminal courts, the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over
the juvenile offender is exclusive,288 and continues until a juvenile reaches
the age of twenty-one if the court rendered any orders concerning him
while he was under eighteen. 28 9 We have already seen that a hearing is
not a prerequisite to a commitment to Dallas under the Pennsylvania
statute. Applying the rationale of Kent v. United States,290 which re-
quires a hearing when the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
may be thrust away by waiver, it would appear to be even more necessary
that a juvenile be afforded a hearing under the Pennsylvania Defective
Delinquent Act with regard to the radical change in status that he may
undergo. When a juvenile is committed to Dallas the approach toward
him changes from a rehabilitative one to one that is penal and punitive
287. Id. at 557.
288. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1964).
289. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (1964).
290. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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in nature. While imprisoned at Dallas, he will be treated no differently
than a criminal, even though the Juvenile Court Act specifically states
that he may not be regarded as a criminal. He will be committed to a
maximum security prison, not a trade school or a home for mentally re-
tarded children, and will receive what Justice Fortas has called "the worst
of both worlds."'291 One could argue that this change from protected
juvenile offender to punished juvenile criminal is a new finding of fact
which requires a separate judicial determination. Kent v. United States,292
United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,293 Douglas v. Alabama,294
and Pointer v. Texas295 indicate that notice, an opportunity to be heard,
the right to counsel, and the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses
may be rights which every juvenile must acquire when he loses, or is
about to lose, the protection of the Juvenile Court.
3. The Treatment of Juvenile Offenders. - The Juvenile Court Act
defines a delinquent as a child who has violated any state or municipal
law or ordinance, has been habitually disobedient so as to be uncontrollable
by his parents or other legal custodian, has been habitually truant from
school or home, or has habitually behaved in a way injurious to the morals
or health of himself or others.296 The Pennsylvania Defective Delinquent
Act permits the commitment of persons presently held before the court as
juvenile delinquents.2 97 Consequently, a child who is a runaway, a truant
or an incorrigible with respect to his parents or any welfare institution
in which he may be housed is a potential candidate for Dallas. This is so
even though he may never have committed a crime, and were it not for a
low I.Q. which may be the cause of his truancy or misbehavior, would
never be considered a potential defective delinquent. Thus begins the
vicious circle which results from the lack of community and state agencies
to deal with the underprivileged child who is poor and culturally or in-
tellectually deprived. An underprivileged child may speak poorly and,
therefore, record a low score on an I.Q. test that is geared to a certain
verbal ability. His cultural experiences and horizons are narrow, so that
his imagination has never been tapped. If he does poorly in school and
fails to adjust, he starts running away or failing to appear for class. He
winds up adjudicated a delinquent because of truancy, and by virtue of
his low performance on I.Q. tests (a critical index for defectiveness) and
his apparent attitude of restlessness and possible rebellion, he is subjected
to testing to determine defective delinquency. This child is not necessarily
a criminal, nor need he ever become one. If he were a well-to-do mentally
retarded child, proper environmental care and guidance would have been
provided for him, and he would have been professionally aided in his
291. Id. at 556.
292. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
293. 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
294. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
295. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
296. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243(a)-(d) (1964).
297. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-3 (1964).
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development. The frustrations that he feels would have been moderated
to a certain extent by training and encouragement. But the impoverished
child for whom there is no adequate state or private facility available, is
on his own and cannot make the needed adjustment. The result may
well be trouble with the juvenile authorities and commitment to Dallas.
The staff at Dallas has recommended that young juveniles (fifteen-
sixteen) and other young first offenders not be committed as defective
delinquents. 298 They are agreed that these young people are not in need
of a maximum security prison, and this is especially true if their delin-
quency is attributable to truancy or a failure to adjust at Pennypack
House. The staff feels that specialized instruction in community schools
can do more to rehabilitate these youngsters than can possibly be done
in a penal institution such as Dallas.
When the administration of Dallas was transferred from the De-
partment of Welfare to the Department of Justice in 1953, a section was
added to the code of criminal procedure: "[f]or the more convenient
punishment of criminals" '299 which provided for the commitment of males
''convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of any crime or crimes,
• . . who would be sentenced by the court to an indefinite sentence in a
penitentiary, or to a general sentence in an industrial school .... 300 The
State Industrial School at Camp Hills0 ' is the only industrial school under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice to which juveniles may be
sentenced. The preamble to the act creating Camp Hill is interesting
for the light it sheds on the physical and psychological atmosphere of the
former industrial school at Huntingdon Prison :302
Whereas, The present Pennsylvania Industrial School at Huntingdon,
originally intended as a Middle State Penitentiary, with its high walls
and towers has all the aspects of a State Penitentiary and the addi-
tion of a medium security bloc has detracted little from its forbidding
appearance, and
Whereas, The internal arrangement of the cell blocks with barred
windows and double locked switches contradicts the idea that this
institution is a school devoted to rehabilitation ...
With the erection of a new industrial school at Camp Hill, the forbidding
penitentiary at Huntingdon became the institution for the detention, care
and treatment of the defective delinquent, and until 1960, children from
the age of fifteen and up were imprisoned there under the conditions
described above. This hardly seems consistent with the notion that juve-
niles are not to acquire the disabilities of the criminal law and are to be
protected and rehabilitated. Furthermore, the criminal procedure addition
298. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
299. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1161 (1964).
300. Ibid.
301. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(e) (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 545-1(1964).
302. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 545-1 (1964).
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of 1953 specifically speaks of the criminals who are to be committed to
Dallas.8 0 3 We have already seen that children in the Juvenile Court are
not to be deemed criminals or convicted of crimes. 0 4 To allow a Juvenile
Court to find a child delinquent and then commit him to Dallas as a
criminal is to completely obliterate and emasculate the theory underlying
the Juvenile Court Act. Even assuming that the condition of the present
institution differs markedly from that which obtained at Huntingdon in
1937, Dallas is still a maximum security prison. In Commonwealth v.
Robinette,3 0 5 the Superior Court held that a juvenile who had attempted
to escape from the Pennsylvania Institution for Defective Delinquents
was subject to indictment and conviction for the criminal offense of
prison breach; his presence at Dallas rendered him no different than
any other criminal who had been convicted and sentenced as a defective
delinquent. When the Department of Justice acquired jurisdiction over
defective delinquents in 1953, power was granted to that department to
"prevent the escape of inmates at all hazards. °306
In returning for a moment to the power of the Juvenile Court to
commit juveniles to Dallas, it is worth noting the possible alternatives
available to a committing judge. After a hearing to inquire into the facts
and record of the juvenile, and a determination by the court that the
mutual best interests of the child and the state "require the care, guidance
and control of such child . . . ,,"SO the court may issue any one of five
orders: The parents of the child may take him back on probation,30 8 or
he may be placed on probation with a good citizen, 30 9 committed to a suit-
able institution or society for the care of dependent, delinquent or neg-
lected children,310 or placed in an appropriate industrial or training school
or county institution.3 1 ' If he is over sixteen, he may be committed to
any state industrial school designed to treat children of his age.3 12 This
last power was added in 1939, two years after the establishment of the
State Industrial School at Camp Hill for children between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-five 31 3 and it is important because it gives the Juvenile
Court power to commit a juvenile to a "home for the reformation and
correction of yofiths above the age of sixteen. '314 We have already estab-
lished that Dallas, as Huntingdon before it, is in no way a "home," but
is a prison that is not oriented toward the treatment of youths.
In reviewing the powers of the Juvenile Court with respect to com-
mitments to Dallas the following is apparent: Juvenile offenders under
303. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1161 (1964).
304. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 261(e) (1964).
305. 182 Pa. Super. 346, 126 A.2d 495 (1956).
306. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.3 (1964).
307. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1964).
308. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(a) (1964).
309. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(b) (1964).
310. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(c) (1964).
311. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(d) (1964).
312. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(e) (1964).
313. Ibid.
314. Ibid.
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sixteen years of age may not be placed with adults. 315 The only state in-
stitution to which the Juvenile Court may commit juveniles is Camp Hill,
and the court may not commit a child to that institution unless he is over
sixteen.3 1 6 If the child is under sixteen, he may be sent to a private insti-
tution which may be state aided, i.e. Glen Mills, or he may be sent to a
county training school.317 The Dallas enabling act is contained in the
code of criminal procedure, and provides that only those who have been
convicted of crimes and have been sentenced to a penitentiary or an in-
dustrial school may be sent to Dallas.3 18 Juveniles are not deemed con-
victed and, therefore, are not sentenced. Although Dallas is empowered
to receive males from the age of fifteen and up, it seems clear that the
Juvenile Court may not commit anyone to Dallas who is less than sixteen.
The Defective Delinquent Act does not give the Juvenile Court any
authority; only the Juvenile Court Act may increase or decrease the
authority of the Juvenile Court. The increase in 1939 which provided for
added state industrial schools and homes for children over sixteen,319 did
not mention Dallas, either specifically or by cross-reference. Furthermore,
the 1953 transfer of Huntingdon from the Department of Welfare to the
Department of Justice clearly eliminates any possibility of the institution
for defective delinquents fitting into the category of a school or home
for youths. 320 In retrospect, it is clear from both the rationale and the
specific statutory language of the Juvenile Court Act that Dallas is not
one of the appropriate institutions to which children before the Juvenile
Court may be committed. Such commitments are in excess of the statu-
tory authority of the Juvenile Court and violative of the spirit of refor-
mation and rehabilitation without punishment that are the cornerstones
of the Juvenile Court Act. Reality, however, has not conformed to the
law.
4. Release Procedures. - According to the staff at Dallas, there are
about 300 juveniles who have been committed and are currently being
housed there.32 1 What recourse have they for release? In the Spring of
1966, Deputy Attorney General Frank Lawley advised the courts of the
Commonwealth that inmates who had been committed, to Dallas by order
of a Juvenile Court could not be detained beyond their twenty-first birth-
day,322 since the Juvenile Court Act continues jurisdiction over the juvenile
only until he reaches his majority.323 The maximum amount of time, then,
that a juvenile may spend at Dallas is six years - from the time he is
315. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 249 (1964).
316. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(e) (1964).
317. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(d) (1964).
318. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1161 (1964).
319. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250(e) (1964).
320. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.3 (1964).
321. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
322. Brief for Appellee, p. 2, In re Miller, ___ Pa. Super. , A.2d -_ (1966).
Based on this recommendation, more than ninety inmates were released from Dallas
by President Judge Adrian Bonnelly of the Philadelphia County Court.
323. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (1964).
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fifteen until he reaches twenty-one years of age. Thus, the section of the
Act which permits the continuous detention of an inmate who has not
recovered by the time his sentence has expired, 24 is inapplicable to the
juvenile, and is unconstitutional under Baxstrom v. Herold.3 25
Since the juvenile is not deemed convicted or sentenced under the
Juvenile Court Act, he may not avail himself of the Post Conviction Hear-
ing Act of 1966.326 His only remedy for an illegal confinement appears
to lie in a writ of coram nobis, a writ of habeas corpus, or a petition for
rehearing before the Juvenile Court which committed him. 27 No right
to counsel is provided in the Act for a juvenile appearing before a county
court, although provision for the representation of juveniles has been
made in Philadelphia County through a voluntary program. An attorney
or some other person in interest should be available to bring the order
of the Deputy Attorney General to the court's attention, as well as the
statutory provisions which grant power to the Juvenile Court. If the
juvenile is twenty-one or more, he must be released if he was committed
as a juvenile. If he is under the age of sixteen, he must also be released
according to our reading of the Juvenile Court Act, since the court had
no power to make the commitment initially. Furthermore, if our reading
of the Juvenile Court Act and its underlying rationale is accurate, no
juvenile may be sent to a prison to be treated as a criminal. All commit-
ments from juvenile courts to Dallas are, therefore, illegal and must be
terminated.
The section of the Defective Delinquent Act which requires that a
recommendation be made by the Board of Dallas with regard to an in-
mate's recovery cannot properly be applied to a commitment made by a
Juvenile Court. To do so would render the section of the Juvenile Court
Act which permits a Juvenile Court to make amendments in its orders by
virtue of its continuing jurisdiction over the juvenile3 28 void. There has
been no repeal of that section by the Juvenile Court Act amendments, or
by the 1953 amendments to the Defective Delinquent Act. The court,
therefore, retains this power and, since it exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over juveniles, it can neither give it up, nor have it taken away by an
administrative board of the correctional system.
5. Maryland and Massachusetts Practice. - In turning briefly to the
Maryland and Massachusetts statutes considered earlier in this comment,
it is of note that Maryland solves the problem of the juvenile by specifically
prohibiting his commitment to Patuxent. The only juveniles who may
324. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-6 (1964).
325. 383 U.S. 107 (1966) ; See also People ex re. Morriale v. Branham, 291 N.Y.
312, 52 N.E.2d 881 (1943).
326. PA. STATr. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1-14 (Supp. 1966). The statute became
effective March 1, 1966. Section 1180-3(a) requires that petitioner must have been
convicted of a crime.
327. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 257-58 (1964). The Juvenile Court may always
amend its orders concerning juveniles under its jurisdiction.
328. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 254 (1964).
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be committed are those to whom the full panoply of procedural rights
have been afforded in a regular criminal prosecution. The statute specifi-
cally states that: "Nothing in this article shall be construed to extend to
or affect any case in a juvenile court or in the court of a magistrate for
juvenile causes, . . . unless the juvenile court judge shall have waived
jurisdiction in the case so that it may be heard and adjudicated in a
regular criminal court.' 3 29 The procedural due process provided for by
statute for commitment to Patuxent is so great as to nullify any argu-
ments that secret "Star Chamber" proceedings may occur.
Massachusetts sets the minimum age for commitment to its depart-
ment for defective delinquents at fifteen,3 0 and requires that notice of a
possible hearing on mental defectiveness be given to the parents or
guardians of persons under age seventeen.3 3 ' In view of the fact that an
individual must have been charged with the commission of one of several
enumerated crimes before he can be committed as a defective delin-
quent 32 it is clear that truants or runaways could not be committed under
the Massachusetts law. Thus, once again, the only juveniles who appear
eligible for commitment under the relevant state statute are those who
have been charged with a crime in regular court proceedings. If children
are not charged with crimes in proceedings before the juvenile court, they
are ineligible for commitment as defective delinquents8 3
A brief look at the treatment of the juvenile under the various
defective delinquent statutes indicates that only the Pennsylvania statute
has serious deficiencies. The young mental defective in Pennsylvania
receives little protection from the Juvenile Court, and may literally be
committed to Dallas without ever appearing before the judge, since no
hearing is required. Furthermore, he is not sent to a school or to a hospital,
but to a maximum security prison in the company of adult male prisoners
who have committed, in some cases, crimes of violence or serious sexual
offenses. The Patuxent Institution, by contrast, is more of a hospital-
treatment-oriented institution than a prison, so that even if juveniles do
reach Patuxent, it is arguable that their chances of getting treatment and
care are much better than they would ever be in Dallas. We are con-
vinced that, in view of the procedural and rehabilitative inadequacies
noted above, the present institutionalization of juveniles at the State Cor-
rectional Institution at Dallas is unconstitutional, violative of the state
statutes, and totally without correctional justification.
329. MD. ANN. CODt art. 31B, § 14 (Supp. 1966).
330. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
331. Ibid.
332. Ibid.
333. In New York, commitment to Napanoch, the state institution for defective
delinquent males, can only occur if the person is over sixteen and has been convicted
of a crime. Juvenile Court authority ends-at age sixteen; therefore, no person eligible
for the specialized care and treatment of the Juvenile Court may be committed.
Robinson, Institutions for Defective Delinquents, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 352, 353-54
(1934).
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VI. THE NATURE OF THE INSTITUTION
In order to appreciate more fully the constitutional and penological
inadequacies of the Pennsylvania State Institution for Defective Delin-
quents, it is necessary to examine the actual operation of Dallas. The
obvious problems inherent in institutionalizing and treating an offender
with a physical or mental handicap become all too obvious when one con-
siders Dallas.
The State Correctional Institution is located on a 1,250 acre site six
miles south of Dallas in Luzerne County, and is 110 miles from Phil-
adelphia. The institution, which was opened in 1960334 at a cost of 12
million dollars, is composed of a complex of twenty buildings which have
a capacity of 952 inmates. Dallas replaced the old institution at Hunting-
don, which had been designated as the institution for the "reception, care,
maintenance, detention, employment, and training of defective delin-
quents" in 1937.335 As of November 10, 1966, there were 601 inmates -
268 juveniles and 333 adults. Of these inmates, 196 of the juveniles were
Negro and 72 were Caucasian,336 while 250 of the adult population were
Caucasian, and 83 Negro.3 3 7 About 239 of the total population came
from Philadelphia.s3 8 The institution is operated by a staff of 297, all of
whom are Caucasian.33 9 The professional staff includes 2 psychologists,
2 social workers, 1 Classification and Treatment Supervisor, 1 Vocational
Adviser, 1 records officer, 1 medical director, a Catholic and a Protestant
chaplain, 4 teachers, 1 institutional school principal, and 17 tradesmen
instructors.3 40 The remainder of the staff perform custodial functions.
There are no full-time, part-time or consulting psychiatrists on the staff, and
there are no clinical psychologists. All personnel at Dallas are civil service
employees, except for the Superintendent. The average per annum sal-
aries are 6,900 dollars for teachers,3 41 9,000 dollars for master's degree
psychologists,3 42 5,500 dollars for tradesmen instructors,3 43 and 5,007
dollars for guards.
3 44
Upon his commitment to Dallas, an inmate is classified for the pur-
poses of housing and work assignment. The aggressiveness of an inmate
appears to be the determining factor in making an assignment, although a
mechanical aptitude is necessary for certain assignments. Classification
for most assignments falls within "light," "medium," and "heavy" cate-
gories, depending upon the degree of the aggressiveness of an inmate;
334. PA. STrAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 542.2 (1964).
335. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 541-1 (1964).
336. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
337. Ibid.
338. Ibid.
339. Ibid.
340. Ibid.
341. Ibid.
342. Ibid.
343. Ibid.
344. Ibid.
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the mixing of adults and juveniles is not considered harmful. The
assignments are divided into six basic skill categories: construction and
maintenance skills, agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry skills,
mechanical skills, service skills, food service skills, and manufacturing
an d processing skills. In general, inmates work a five-day week in shops
that in many cases are quite ambitious and well run. The inmates in these
areas maintain the entire prison and appear to be working to the capacity
of their manual and mental skills. 3 45 Schooling is provided for one and
one-half hours each day. At one time one-half of the day was allocated
for school, but the staff found that the attention span of the inmates made
this arrangement unworkable a 46
But while the work assignments are an integral part of the institu-
tion's program, acquiring a skill is not considered a primary purpose of
the program. The aim of the program is to develop an inmate's internal
controls and ability to cope with his problems so that he may re-enter
society.347 An individual's "attitude" is the main criterion used by the
institution to determine his progress and readiness for release. Every
eight months each inmate appears before the entire staff for evaluation.
No psychological tests are administered, but the individual's overall con-
duct and his school record are considered. His block behavior, and his
relationship with his peers, and the group he works with determine his
progress. Regular block reports, which consist of custodians' answers to
multiple choice questions, are made to evaluate an inmate's work, general
behavior and attitudes. They are filed by all custodial personnel. Each in-
mate must attain a "Bond of Honor," an award given for proper conduct
over a period of time, before he can be considered for release. The release
procedure employed is quite analogous to that used in determining eligi-
bility for parole in the normal penal institution. The major difference is
one of orientation, since the defective delinquent's problem is that he has
not been able to relate to his peers and members of his own group on the
outside, whereas the normal offender can easily choose to follow the rules,
play the game, and take advantage of "time off for good behavior." The
minimum time within which an inmate might achieve Bond of Honor
status would be about three months, 348 and it is very easy to lose that
status for any latent or overt homosexual act. Much of the responsibility
for recognizing homosexual tendencies is placed with the custodial force,
and there is a place on each block or work report for the evaluation of
an inmate's sexual behavior. The staff states that the guards and trades-
men instructors are trained to look for certain types of behavior indica-
tive of homosexual tendencies. 3 49 The Bond of Honor award, and the
345. Ibid.
346. Ibid.
347. See TFETIRS & RINSMANN, THt CHALLENGP op DELINQUZNCY 568-73(1950) ; Gunzburg, Vocational and Social Rehabilitation of the Feebleminded in
MENTAL D9VICItNCY - THn CHANGING OUTLOOK 334 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
348. Ibid.
349. Ibid.
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degree of the Bond awarded, will also govern the wages the inmate is to
receive for his work. An inmate who has non-bond of honor status may
earn 15 cents an hour, while a #1 class bond holder gets 20 cents per hour,
a #2 class holder gets 25 cents per hour, and a #3 class holder gets 50
cents per hour.3 50
The religious practices at Dallas are purely optional. A chaplain is
always on duty and services are held on Sundays for the inmates, 351 but
no one is required to attend religious services, and it is not viewed as a
setback to release if an inmate does not attend.3 52 Frequently, however,
release plans provide for contact with some religious authority. The Black
Muslims are not permitted to perform their rituals, since the religion is
not recognized by the Commonwealth,3 53 and several riots have occurred
at Dallas in the last few years in which Black Muslim involvement has
been suspected.
The physical plant at Dallas consists in part of a maximum security
cell block constructed in tiers; solitary confinement is in barred cells, but
each cell has an outside window. The upper tier of this block houses the
active homosexuals, 3 54 while the lower tier houses persons who were
brought before the Behavior Clinic and placed in Administrative Segrega-
tion.3 55 The cells are steel-gray and contain a bed and mattress, a chest
of drawers, a sink, a toilet, and occasionally, some shelves. They are very
poorly lit and very depressing in atmosphere. There is a leisure area
at the end of the block which consists of long wooden benches arranged
in a gray cement and cinder-block room. The walls are completely barren,
and except for a television that is locked into the wall, one certainly does
not experience any feeling of leisure about this room. Dallas also has a
medium security block, with cells laid out in the same manner as in the
maximum security area, except for the fact that the rooms and corridors
have been decorated in some respect. The layout of cells is also the same
in the minimum security area and pre-release section, but the leisure room
in these areas is larger and contains pingpong tables, as well as television.
The inmates in these blocks are less confined, but are still locked into and
out of their individual cells. All prisoners eat in the same dining room
and are marched to all activities from their respective cell blocks. The
officers and staff eat in a separate dining room, but are served the same
food as the inmates, which is nutritious and appetizing. The service in
the dining room is by the inmates, and the food is prepared by them under
the supervision of several outside cooking instructors. General recrea-
tional facilities consist of a library, hobby rooms, leisure rooms, movies
and a gym for certain sports. Basketball, softball and football are played
on an intramural basis, and handball and horseshoes are also available.
350. Ibid.
351. Ibid.
352. Ibid.
353. Ibid.
354. Ibid.
355. Ibid.
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The gym is convertible into a movie theatre and movies are shown regu-
larly and on holidays. Dallas also has a well-staffed hospital, but part of
the hospital wing has just been converted for the reception of non-defective
tubercular patients from other state prisons. 356
Visitation by family and people who correspond with the inmates is
permissible once every fifteen days, Monday through Saturday, from
12:45-3:45 p.m. and up to four people are permitted to visit at one time. No
Sunday visitation is allowed except with written permission of the Super-
intendent, and then only once every three months. No visitation is per-
mitted at all on Christmas, Easter or July 4 because of the crowding that
might result. Visitation by family is very small since Dallas is inconven-
ient and expensive to reach by public transportation, and also because
the families, in many cases, are eager to forget their "Dallas relatives."
The major problem at Dallas appears to be one of orientation. Dallas
is correctionally oriented as compared to Patuxent (the Maryland defec-
tive delinquent institution) and Napanoch (the similar New York insti-
tution), which are psychiatrically oriented. The Dallas concept of the
defective delinquent is that he is a criminal offender with an intelligence
handicap, and devoid of the type of psychiatric disorders which would
require a medical orientation and a staff psychiatrist. One of the out-
standing characteristics of the mentally deficient is his inability to verbal-
ize the interpersonal nature of his problems. In view of this fact, the
staff at Dallas feel that the intense psychotheraphy or analysis a psychia-
trist offers is useless, since its effectiveness is dependent upon an ability
to communicate.3 57 It is generally agreed that, at the present time, intense
psychotherapy is of little value in treating the defective delinquent. Rather,
group therapy is generally considered by experts to be the most effective
form of treatment.3 5 8 Presently, eighty-six per cent of Patuxent's popu-
lation are receiving this type of treatment, 3 59 while only 32 out of 601 in-
mates at Dallas are involved in this type of therapy.3 0
Patuxent's psychiatric orientation may be attributed to the definition
of defective delinquency contained in the Maryland statute. Maryland
includes the abnormal as well as the subnormal offender under its statute,
while excluding the psychotic individual whose needs would best be met
in a mental institution. 3 1 Thus, Maryland's view of the defective delin-
quent tends to associate mental subnormality and mental abnormality.
"Up to August of 1965, out of a total of 379 committed patients, 274 had
demonstrated emotional unbalance and the remaining 105, . . . exhibited
a combination of intellectual deficiency and emotional unbalance. 3 62 No
356. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
357. Ibid.
358. See Gunzburg, Psychotherapy with the Feebleminded in MENTAL DvFi-
CIENCY - THE CHANGING OUTLOOK 367 (Clarke & Clarke ed. 1958).
359. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, Md. , ... 221 A.2d 397,
424 (1966).
360. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 10, 1966.
361. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 31B, § 5 (Supp. 1966).
362. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, . Md. -' , 221 A.2d 397,
420 n.ll.
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inmate was classified strictly as a mental defective. A study of New
York's institution for defective delinquents in 1933 revealed that a large
proportion of the true defective delinquents were psychopathic as well
as defective - abnormal as well as subnormal. 3 3 Finally, Gunzburg states
that "nowadays the existence of neurotic problems in mental deficiency
cannot be denied, though they may be overlooked or suppressed. 30 4 The
need for further study in this area is certainly of primary importance.
Aside from a proper diagnosis of the problems inherent in mental
deficiency, the need for a medical orientation at Dallas is evident in other
areas. The search for effective methods of treating the defective delin-
quent should be a never-ending process. The institution itself is a fairly
modern experiment, and yet in many respects the correctional attitude
pervades the atmosphere of the institution to such a degree that innova-
tion and experimentation are rare. One of the administrators of the in-
stitution informed the authors that "psychiatry has produced nothing new
in the past 30 years." When questioned about the possibility of a "half-
way house" to assist the inmate in his return to the community, the same
administrator candidly informed us that "these men are criminals and we
don't lead them by the hand.138 5
Finally, the composition of Dallas itself speaks of the need for a
medical orientation. The staff at Dallas informed us that they consider
a certain percentage of the inmates psychotic or mentally disturbed to
such a degree that the institution could only tender custodial care for
them. In view of the fact that a segment of the population has been
committed as a result of sex offenses, the probability of mental problems
requiring psychiatric attention increases. 366 The Maryland Defective De-
linquent Act has been characterized as a law which "represents the grow-
ing body of legislation which has arisen to enable the psychiatrist to
implement the responsibility of dealing with persons not judged legally
insane but recidivists. '36 7 The difference between the Maryland and Penn-
sylvania statutes is not great enough to justify the great disparity in orienta-
tion, treatment, and approach that exists between Dallas and Patuxent.
VII. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A Need for Dallas?
Having completed our study of the Pennsylvania Defective Delin-
quent Act, we are convinced that there is a definite need for a specialized
institution for the defective delinquent in Pennsylvania. However, it is
363. Robinson, Institutions for Defective Delinquents, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
352, 355 (1934).
364. Op. cit. supra note 358.
365. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.366. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (1964), providing for the
specialized commitment of sexual psychopaths under the Barr-Walker Act.367. Boslow, Rosenthal & Gliedman, The Maryland Defective Delinquency Law -Implication for the Treatment of Antisocial Disorders Under the Law, 10 BRIT. J.
or DELINQUENcY 5 (1960).
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believed that such an institution should be selective so as to exclude
those who can best be dealt with in other surroundings. It should be un-
derstood prior to our discussion of the ideal institution that such an in-
stitution as we shall propose can only be useful if there are a variety of
sentencing alternatives available to committing judges. A judge's choice
should not be limited to probation, prison or Dallas, but there should be
a flexibility in sentencing alternatives so that individualization of treat-
ment and confinement can be accomplished in the most effective way pos-
sible. Dallas should not become a dumping ground merely because there
is no other place to send persons who technically fit into the statutory
category of defective delinquent. In. order to implement any of the rec-
ommendations in this paper, it would be necessary to revise the entire
penal and correctional scheme of the Commonwealth. The coordination
of all state and private agencies with their years of experience and skill
in dealing with these difficult and highly specialized problems is a pre-
requisite to any effective correctional program.
Penology in its most enlightened form seeks to rehabilitate persons
who have gotten into trouble with the law and return them to society as
useful and productive law abiding citizens. The fact that penal institu-
tions have been ineffective in achieving this objective is evidenced by the
average recidivism rate for the "normal" offender of about fifty per
cent.368 The percentage of returnees to Dallas is between six and eight
per cent. 369 Of course, there is no way of knowing what percentage of
discharged persons wind up in institutions in other states, or in other
correctional institutions in the Commonwealth. Theoretically, a defective
delinquent must not remain a defective delinquent, since release is predi-
cated upon his recovery. But recovery, according to the staff, simply
means that one has a better than average chance of staying out of trouble
because he can now cope with his frustrations ;370 it does not mean that
he will never again be in trouble with the law.
The factors which contribute to the need for special segregation of
the defective delinquent are: (1) the regular probation officer already has
too great a case load and cannot provide the extra supervision this indi-
vidual requires; (2) regular homes for the mentally retarded cannot
handle the defective delinquent because they are so overcrowded that,
in the interval between request and actual entry, the defective delinquent
may get into more trouble, and once admitted, may "contaminate" the
non-delinquent inmates; and (3) a regular institution for juvenile delin-
quents cannot be employed to treat the juvenile who is a defective delin-
quent because he will be exploited by the brighter children and get into
continuous trouble.371 In 1930 the federal prison authorities established
368. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
369. Ibid.
370. Ibid.
371. Andriola, Some Suggestions for Treating the Defective Delinquent, 31 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 297, 299-300 (1940).
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a special institution in Springfield, Missouri for mental defectives, as well
as psychopaths, psychotics, sexual perverts, and tubercular and other
chronic medical cases.3 7 2 It was felt that they should be siphoned off from
the larger federal prison population because they created problems in the
larger institution and were in need of specialized care and treatment. The
orientation of this particular installation was medical, and it was staffed
almost entirely by Public Health Officers. 373 This attempt, and the at-
tempts in Maryland, Massachusetts and New York which have already
been discussed briefly, indicate that there is a place in a state correctional
system for a specialized institution. Although it may not be necessary
that it be quite as specialized as Dallas, the institution should resemble
Patuxent more in the type of inmate which it seeks to treat. In addition,
it may well be undesirable to treat some of the people presently committed
to Dallas as problems of the correctional system at all. It is hoped that
no revisions would occur in this field without a close look at the way the
new Mental Health Act3 74 may facilitate a new approach to the treatment
of some of the persons presently incarcerated in the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas.
B. Drafting a Constitutional Law
Assuming a new and flexible approach to sentencing existed in the
Commonwealth, and various institutional and non-institutional approaches
were available to the sentencing judge, what should the statute provide?
Without getting down to specific language, there are some things that
should be carefully set out to avoid any constitutional attacks:
The definition of a defective delinquent should be drawn in such a
way that the age limit for commitment would be between sixteen and
twenty-five. It is the feeling of the staff at Dallas that a first-offender
who is over twenty-five will receive adequate treatment in a regular penal
institution.3 75 Juveniles who have been adjudicated defective delinquents
because of truancy, running away or incorrigibility should be dealt with
close to their homes, and not in a large institutional complex.376 This
would place offenders who have been convicted of more than one crime
of a violent nature against the person into the category ripe for treat-
ment at this new institutional complex. 377 The definition of mental de-
ficiency should require the commission of one of several specifically
enumerated crimes as a condition precedent to commitment.3 7 8 The defini-
372. Id. at 301.
373. Ibid.
374. PA. STAT'. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Supp. 1966) (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
375. Interview with staff at Dallas, Nov. 25, 1966.
376. Ibid.
377. Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 28
(1962).
378. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(a) (Supp. 1966); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123,
§ 113 (1965).
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tion should also include a ceiling on I.Q. which would serve as a cut-off
point. This ceiling should be approximately eighty on the Wechsler-
Bellevue scale. However, since intellectual deficiency alone is not a suf-
ficient ground for commitment to such a specialized institution, 379 evi-
dence of mental instability should also be required. Thus, a sexual psycho-
path with an I.Q. of eighty or less who had committed several sexual
offenses would be a candidate for commitment to the institution. At the
same time, a bottom level of an I.Q. of fifty would eliminate those people
from sentence to this institution who are not generally considered responsi-
ble in the legal sense and, who would be more suitably cared for in a
mental institution that did not have a correctional orientation.
The definition eventually arrived at should not be inflexibly set down
in the statute, since literature and experience in the field of psychiatry
change rapidly, and the law is traditionally slow in keeping up with
definitional changes. It is recommended that the specific crimes be defined
by statute, as well as the I.Q. ranges. However, the types of mental in-
stability which will bring a person within the statute should be defined
broadly, with a mandate to the Department of Health or Welfare to pro-
vide a working definition and the guidelines within which the statute
should be applied. Terms such as psychopath and sociopath have little
meaning today. Consequently, rather than using catch-all but elusive
phrases, it is desirable that administrative guidelines be formulated which
would be periodically reviewed by an administrator and serve as manda-
tory standards for the enforcement of the statute. These definitional aids
will assist the examiners in finding the necessary mental instability, and
will give the courts and lawyers something against which to check the
findings of the examiners. The guidelines should contain not only defini-
tions, but also the tests employed to discover the presence or absence of
mental instability. Testing procedures should be uniform throughout the
state and in conformity with these standards. There should also be a
standing committee of the legislature which would be empowered to
periodically review the administration of the defective delinquent statute,
as well as other statutes concerned with the operation of the correctional
system of the state. Implicit in such a review would be an analysis of
the validity of standards set forth by the administrator. This total review
procedure should prevent the lodging of too great a discretion in the
administrator and, at the same time, allow for flexibility and currency
in the use of terms and testing materials in the execution of the statute.
Procedurally, the statute should require that written notice of the
pending proceeding be given to the defendant or his guardian, if he is
under twenty-one, and that the defendant be afforded a right to counsel,
a hearing at which time evidence to challenge the findings of the examin-
ing committee may be presented, a right to a jury trial, an opportunity
to appeal the finding of defective delinquency, and a right to proceed
379. See notes 94-100 supra and accompanying text.
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in forma pauperis. This last requirement is essential not only with regard
to transcripts and records, but also as an aid in obtaining court-appointed
counsel, and a court paid psychiatrist or other medical examiner for the
defense. Furthermore, the contents of pre-sentence report should be dis-
closed to counsel for the State, as well as to defense counsel and the court,
and the defendant should be afforded an opportunity to compel the
appearance of witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine the doctors
who prepared the report. The request to commit the defendant as a de-
fective delinquent should be permitted to come from the state, the court,
defense counsel, the defendant, or from the diagnostic and classification
center which first receives the convicted defendant for placement in the
correctional system. No petition should be accepted, however, unless it
states with some degree of particularity the reasons for suspicion of de-
fective delinquency. This will avoid unnecessary delaying and stigmatizing
tactics by the state or the classification center.
The examination should be conducted at the institution for defective
delinquents, or at another mental health institution, by at least two psychia-
trists, or one psychiatrist and one psychologist, and should include psycho-
logical testing, a psychiatric interview, a family interview, an examination
of the court record, physical testing, including an electroencephalogram,
and any other type of inquiry that would aid the administrative staff
setting reliable standards. Patuxent has found that a fairly comprehen-
sive examination can be made in ninety days, 380 while Massachusetts
limits confinement for examination to thirty-five days.3 81 We recommend
a ninety day commitment for examination purposes, with a possible exten-
sion of thirty days upon request to the court. The initial commitment for
examination could occur only if the court were satisfied that a possibility
of mental deficiency existed after reviewing the particulars set forth in
the petition. If at the end of the ninety day period, the examiners (whose
statutory qualification and fees should be clearly established) agreed that
no mental instability existed, the defendant would be returned to the
court for other disposition of his case. If a finding of mental instability
were made within the requisite I.Q. range, the report of the exam-
iners, together with their reasons and conclusions, would be returned to
the court, and a hearing convened at which time the report would be
presented and subject to challenge. A jury would be convened to hear
the evidence, and the members of the jury would be instructed to find a
special verdict on the issue of defective delinquency within the statutory
standards. There would be a right of appeal from a finding of defective
delinquency.
Once a finding of defective delinquency had been made final, the
judge would commit the defendant to the specialized institution. The
380. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, __ Md. _. ---- ,- 221 A.2d 397,
421 (1966).
381. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
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term of commitment to such institution would be no greater than the
maximum provided by law for the specific offense charged. The finding
of defective delinquency should guide the committing judge in his imposi-
tion of sentence, so that a longer sentence than normal for the crime
committed might be fixed within the allowable maximum in order to
assure an adequate time for treatment. During the period of confinement
in the institution, there should be mandatory review of the defendant's
condition every six to eight months, and a written report on his progress
should be submitted to the committing court once every twelve months.
At least once every year during the period of confinement, there should
be a complete retesting of the inmate in order to determine if the status
of defective delinquent is still warranted, and at the end of two years,
a petition for review of his commitment should lie to the committing court.
In no event should the right of habeas corpus be denied if the annual
testing indicates that the defendant is no longer appropriately termed a
defective delinquent. The release proceeding should be capable of being
initiated by the defendant, members of his family or other interested
persons, or by the committing court on its own motion, or on the recom-
mendation of the institution itself. The right to counsel and an appropri-
ate hearing should be granted during the release proceeding as well, and
the State should be adequately represented.
At the end of a five year period, the institution should be required
to consider whether it has done all that it can for the inmate. If it is
found that another institution should now take over, assuming release
into society is inappropriate, or impossible by virtue of the inmate's un-
expired sentence, a recommendation should be made to the court and
another disposition made of the inmate's case. Apart from release direct-
ly into the community, the alternatives of parole, work-release, half-way
houses in the community, and week-end leaves should exist. All of these
are designed to test the staying power of the treatment and care which
the institutional framework has provided the defendant. A gradual re-
linquishment of confinement should be attempted in an effort to return
the inmate to society on a permanent basis.
The institution for defective delinquents should be under the juris-
diction of the Department of Welfare rather than the Department of
Justice. At present, the outlook of the Department of Justice is largely
correctional, and not rehabilitative. Progress in adapting techniques and
developing programs for this specialized type of offender have therefore
been very slow. There is an office of Mental Retardation in the Depart-
ment of Welfare, and its skill and resources would be critical to the de-
velopment of adequate treatment facilities and the training of personnel.
The Department of Public Instruction could also make a definite con-
tribution to the program, since most of the work in the field of mental
retardation has been done in the educational area. Experimentation with
new and imaginative forms of treatment, from group therapy to drugs
and hypnosis, should be encouraged, since there are no pat answers to
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the treatment of the mentally defective. Vocational rehabilitation services
throughout the state could be utilized in working out vocational programs
which would be meaningful to the mentally retarded or emotionally un-
stable defendant, and the Parole Board could apply its contacts and know-
how with regard to the placement of ex-convicts to aid the defective
delinquent. Private agencies should be called upon to create small pilot
projects in treatment and rehabilitation. The state should be willing to
experiment at all levels to try to solve the problem of the recidivistic
offender, normal, abnormal or subnormal. Institutions that have met with
success should be coaxed to cooperate in assisting the state in setting up
its planning programs. Coordination of all relevant agencies to work on
this problem should be the keynote of the approach. Duplication of process
should be avoided, but at the same time the expertise of all the appropri-
ate groups should be culled for solutions.
The physical plant and treatment program is left for the experts to
develop since we do not pretend to have any adequate answers. Our con-
cern in this paper has been largely that of a lawyer looking at a very poor
statute and trying to achieve the underlying purposes of the law within
constitutional limits. Within the realm of our capabilities, we have offered
some suggestions for change in both the statute and the institution. How-
ever, it is the larger aspect of the total correctional system of the state
that must be exposed and reviewed if any progress is to be made. Hit or
miss approaches to these immense problems are not appropriate. An in-
crease in the rape penalty without some specialized approach in the insti-
tution does not solve the problem of recidivism, since eventually the de-
fendant is released. If all that has been done for him in fifteen years is
locking him up, the probability that he will soon be in front of a judge
again is great, and imposing a sentence of from one day to life will not
rehabilitate this prisoner if he is still treated no differently than the normal
offender. Borrowing statutes from other states without reference to what
is practicable in our own, as was the case with the Barr-Walker Act, is
dangerous, since another penal system may operate under a totally dif-
ferent approach. Much can be gained, however, from the study of the
approach taken to these problems in other states, and even other countries.
The Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia has submitted
several proposals for the revision of Pennsylvania's Defective Delinquent
Act, which we have examined, in their preliminary stage. The District
Attorney's proposals parallel our own recommendations in several respects,
but there are also several areas in which we are in disagreement. The
District Attorney's report speaks of a chronic criminal who is "dangerous
to society, '83 2 and requires the conviction of a crime against the person
and a finding of mental defectiveness as a prerequisite to commitment.
The problem arises with the use of the word "dangerous," since it is very
382. PHILADELPHIA DISTRIcT ATTORNEY, PRELIMINARY RroPRT ON PROC8DURES
FOR DEFECTIVEs 4 (Oct. 17, 1966).
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difficult to define or to measure a person's dangerousness in advance.
Conviction of a crime may indicate that an individual was dangerous on
the day when the crime was committed, but it is virtually impossible to
make a determination that he is going to be dangerous for a potential
period in the future. There are a few projective tests that can adequately
predict the future aggressive behavior of "normal" offenders,3 83 but they
are meaningless when applied to the mental defective, since they generally
require that the subject of the test be able to think abstractly.38 4 Thus,
this requirement of dangerousness would make the statute vague, not
subject to proper measurement, and possibly void under constitutional
guidelines. The same problem arises under the release procedure con-
templated by the District Attorney's Preliminary Report,38 5 since release
can only be had upon a recommendation of the institution that "the in-
mate is no longer a chronic criminal dangerous to society .. .-"18 or upon
such a recommendation made by the court after complete psychiatric
testing in either case.3
87
Another problem with the Report arises from the fact that it dis-
tinguishes between mental defectiveness coupled with dangerousness and
mutual defectiveness without dangerousness. A dangerous mental defec-
tive who is convicted of a serious crime would be sentenced from one
day to life, while a non-dangerous mental defective would be committed
as a normal offender unless the committing judge were of the opinion that
his particular defect required a longer institutionalization.38 8 In addition,
release of a non-dangerous mental defective would be conditioned on his
passing a battery of psychological tests sixty days before his sentence is
up. If the tests show that he will not be able to function on his own in
the community, he may be committed to the Department of Welfare
under the Mental Health Act.3 8 9 Consequently, a non-dangerous mental
defective gets a possible life commitment to a mental institution after
he has served his term, while another inmate who is not mentally defective
cannot be examined at the expiration of his sentence for commitment to
a mental health institution, even though he may be potentially more dan-
gerous. This proposal appears to work the same inequality of treatment
which is subject to constitutional attack.390 Patuxent specifically excludes
commitment to its institution once a sentence has expired,3 9 ' and People
ex rel. Morriale v. Branham,3 92 casts serious doubt on the validity of the
383. See notes 116-22 supra and accompanying text.
384. See section III supra.
385. Supra note 382, at 5.
386. Ibid.
387. Ibid.
388. Supra note 382, at 6.
389. Ibid.
390. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), 12 VILL. L. Rnv. 178
(1966).
391. MD. ANN. ConDe art. 31B, § 6(c) (Supp. 1966).
392. 291 N.Y. 312, 52 N.E.2d 881 (1943).
COMMENTS
57
Gafni and Welsh: Post Conviction Problems and the Defective Delinquent
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
proposed procedure. Furthermore, it is questionable that once the sen-
tence is ended, there is any continuing crime which can form the basis of
an involuntary commitment to a mental health institution. Of course, our
analysis of this proposal is with the knowledge that it is a preliminary
one. What has been said above is a reaction to the possible difficulties
that arise from the proposal in its initial stages. The final draft may
eliminate what are deemed the undesirable features.
In summation, one should be mindful of the dangers to society re-
sulting from mentally disturbed or mentally defective offenders, and
aware that an attempt must be made to reduce the recidivism rate of all
offenders and to make our correctional system the most effective possible.
At the same time, constitutional guarantees must not be ignored. Having
dealt extensively with the pre-conviction area of criminal prosecution, the
Supreme Court is now faced with a number of post-conviction challenges.
In drafting any future legislation, there should be an attempt to achieve
that measure of procedural due process at all stages of the proceedings
which will make the statutory scheme invulnerable to constitutional at-
tack. It is by doing what is fair, and not merely providing for minimum
safeguards that such invulnerability will be insured. The Maryland statute
granted procedural due process from the outset, was tested many times,
and is still being tested in the state and federal courts. The Pennsylvania
statute has provided no procedural protections and met little attack before
the recent furor over the "forgotten men." The Maryland statute has
been upheld several times in recent years; if and when the Pennsylvania
statute is subjected to a proper constitutional attack in the courts, it should
be struck down. Hopefully, the legislature will have seen the handwriting
on the wall, and will move soon to correct the inequities which are rife
throughout this statutory scheme.
Miriam L. Gafni
Barney B. Welsh
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